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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

his issue contains several articles of interest. We start with a review of the
past year’s criminal decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Canada. We are incredibly grateful to Berkeley Law Professor Chuck Weisselberg, who has been reviewing the United States Supreme
Court’s criminal cases for us for the past decade. This year, our Canadian columnist, Judge Wayne Gorman, has devoted his column in the issue to recent Canadian criminal decisions. The issue also includes several other articles, with topics
ranging from how to reduce racial disparities in the criminal-justice system to
how to cut ties on social media when ethically required to do so.
You’ll find a very special item on the back cover of this issue—a Procedural
Fairness Bench Card. The bench card project was initiated by the American Judges
Association and joined in by the Center for
Court Innovation, the National Center for State
Courts, and the National Judicial College. For
the Court Review version of the bench card, since
we had to include your address on the back
cover, there’s some wasted space. At the AJA
website (amjudges.org), you’ll find a bench card
with that space filled in with six suggested additional readings you can find on the web. As
many of you know, promoting procedural fairness in court has been a major AJA initiative
since 2007. We hope you’ll find the bench card
helpful.
This issue marks my last as editor, a task I
took on in 1998. Working on Court Review has been one of the most rewarding
parts of my career. I have gotten to recruit (as authors) and work with leading
experts in so many fields of law and social science. I have made friends throughout the United States, Canada, and beyond. And I have learned so much that has
enhanced my work as a judge.
There are too many people to thank in this note, but I do want to thank all the
members of our Editorial Board and the authors who have contributed to this
journal. Very special thanks to Alan Tomkins, who served as my coeditor from
2007 to 2014, and Eve Brank, who has served as my coeditor from 2015 to the
present. Both of them served while also full-time professors of law and psychology, and they have been a great help in getting many of the top experts in that
field to share their knowledge on these pages. My law clerks and staff have also
been tremendously helpful, as have Chuck Campbell, who has served as our
Managing Editor since 2000, and Mike Fairchild (m-designstudio.com), who has
done our layout work since 1998.
My thanks to the American Judges Association for giving me this opportunity.
And my appreciation to the four judges—Julie Kunce Field, Devin Odell, David
Prince, and David Shakes—who join Eve Brank as the five-person editing team
starting with the next issue.
In closing, I note that all Court Review issues from 1998 forward are available
on the AJA website. I have gone through all of those issues to see which articles
and book reviews still have the most value for judges today. That listing of The
Best of Court Review: 1998–2017 starts at page 178.—SL
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President’s Column
Catherine Shaffer

M

y dear colleagues and fellow Court Review readers,
greetings.
In my last column, I told you about AJA’s wonderful Cleveland conference in September, ably planned by our
own Judges Michael Cicconetti, Eugene Lucci, and Gayle
Williams-Byers. There, our past AJA Presidents also met and
identified a key priority for AJA—enhancing the value of membership for members who are unable to attend conferences. This
is the first of my three overlapping priorities for my term as AJA
President. My second is to build on AJA’s advances toward furthering diversity in our organization and on the bench, while
helping us all achieve better understanding of and responses to
diversity issues in our courts. The third is to
strengthen AJA’s ties to other national court-oriented organizations, reach out to national minoritylawyer organizations with judicial divisions, and
find new ways to collaborate with our national
court-oriented partners.
To carry out these goals, I asked AJA members to
sign up for the committees that interest them.
Everyone who did that got an email appointing
them to their committee and suggesting that their
committee zero in on and work to achieve two or
three objectives to build AJA membership value for
members who do not come to conference. Committee meetings
are underway. It is not too late to sign up.
I also talked recently to our national partner representatives.
After excellent talks with Benes Aldana, the president of the
National Judicial College (NJC), there are now 10 scholarships,
for $500 each, available to AJA members who want to attend an
NJC course. AJA has been invited to send a representative as an
“observer,” tuition free, to one of the 2018 classes on “Advanced
Procedural Fairness” (one held in January and a second set for
September in Anchorage). AJA will co-sponsor and plan with
NJC a joint event aimed at continuing the national conversation
on race. The AJA president will be invited to address the NJC’s
General Jurisdiction classes. NJC is distributing our membership literature at the college. AJA may support with NJC a 2019
Judicial Academy for lawyers interested in the bench. And NJC
is cooperating with a presentation of one of our Hawai’i educational programs and considering possible co-location of an NJC
course with a future AJA conference.
I also talked with the current presidents of the National Association for Court Management, the Conference of State Court
Administrators (COSCA), and the National Association of State
Judicial Educators, all longstanding partners of AJA, about
potential for future closer collaboration. All three organizations
seem very receptive to making their ties with us even closer.
I was honored to represent AJA at the Rehnquist Awards
event on November 16 in Washington, D.C. Our own Judge

Elizabeth Hines, a longtime National Center for State Courts
board member, was there and introduced me. Attendees stayed
at the historic Willard Hotel and were hosted by Chief Justice
John Roberts at the United States Supreme Court for the awards
dinner. This year’s award winner was the Honorable Kim Berkeley Clark of the Allegheny County (Pa.) Court of Common
Pleas. Her practice as a judge exemplifies AJA’s signature initiative, procedural fairness. Her wonderful acceptance speech will
be reprinted in a future edition of Court Review.
In late November, I went to the COSCA mid-year meeting in
New Orleans. This conference was highlighted by educational
programs on developments in court technology and data management, on responding to emerging disruptive
technologies like neuroscience, block chaining,
robotics, and virtual reality, on understanding
and responding to opiate addiction, and on
techniques to handle judicial- and court- leadership challenges. Another conference highlight
was the reception in the Louisiana Supreme
Court, also the seat of the Louisiana Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for which the
chief judge is none other than AJA past president James F. McKay.
Much more is coming up in 2018. Our executive committee met in January in Napa, California, a possible
venue for a future spring AJA conference. This year’s AJA
midyear conference is from April 19 to 21 in Memphis—at the
Guest House at Graceland. Judge Betty Moore and Justice
Robert Torres have nailed down a fantastic education program,
which will include presentations on judicial ethics, courthouse
security, using reflective practices in judging, and a forensic look
at the cold case of Elbert Williams. Outstanding planned events
include a “Barbecue Feast” at Alfred’s on Beale Street.
In September 2018, we will enjoy our fall conference in
Kuaui. Judge Catherine Carlson and Justice Torres have this
event fully planned. Reserve your calendars to visit this beautiful Hawaiian garden island! In September 2019, we will be in
Chicago, and our conference will be in partnership with the Illinois state courts. The spring 2020 midyear will be in gorgeous
Savannah, Georgia. Tentatively we are planning for Philadelphia, another historic venue, in fall 2020.
Now is the time to reach out to courts in these areas to plan
together in advance. Can you help? Please think about your
ability to connect us to court organizations and court-oriented
organizations in which you participate, for future collaboration
to begin. We need you, and your knowledge, passion, and
engagement.
I look forward to seeing your contributions, to hearing from
you, and to seeing many of you at upcoming conferences. And
I wish you a wonderful and productive 2018.
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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

A Review of Decisions Rendered
by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Criminal Matters:
January 1 to November 30, 2017
Wayne K. Gorman

T

his column will review those decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of Canada, between January 1 and
November 30, 2017, that involved criminal causes or
matters. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a
multitude of issues involving criminal law, including defences,
evidence, and sentencing. The Court also considered the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, to various criminal-law provisions and
procedures.
Let us start with the Supreme Court’s consideration in 2017
of criminal offences.

(1) OFFENCES:

(A) BREATHALYZER DEMANDS:
Section 253 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to
operate a motor vehicle in Canada with a blood-alcohol level
that exceeds 80 milligrams of alcohol per every 100 milliliters
of blood. The Criminal Code allows the Crown to establish a
person’s blood-alcohol level through the introduction of a certificate prepared by a police officer who conducted a breathalyzer test upon the accused. Section 258 of the Criminal Code
creates a presumption that the certificate is accurate if the samples were taken within a prescribed time period.
In R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, a vehicle being operated by the
accused was stopped by the police. The accused provided samples of his breath that registered blood-alcohol levels above the
legal limit. He was charged with driving “over 80,” contrary to
section 253 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court noted
that, to rely upon the section 258 presumptions, the Crown
must prove that the breath samples were “taken within a prescribed period of time following the alleged offence; the samples have to be provided directly into an approved container or
instrument; and the instrument has to be operated by a properly qualified technician” (at paragraph 4).
At his trial, the trial judge found that the police officer did

Footnotes
1. Sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter state as follows:
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.
24(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-
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not have lawful grounds to have made the breathalyzer
demand, but concluded that it was not necessary for the
Crown to prove that a lawful demand had been made to rely on
the evidentiary presumption contained within section 258 of
the Criminal Code.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the following
issue was raised (at paragraph 5): “The issue in this appeal is
whether, in addition to the three preconditions just mentioned,
the Crown must also establish that the demand for the breath
sample made by the police was a ‘lawful’ demand before it can
take advantage of the evidentiary shortcuts.”
The Supreme Court concluded, at paragraph 11, that the
Crown did not have to
prove that the demand was lawful in order to take advantage of the shortcuts. If the taking of the samples is subjected to Charter scrutiny, and the evidence of the breath
test results is found to be inadmissible by virtue of ss. 8
and 24(2) of the Charter, that will end the matter. Resort
to the evidentiary shortcuts will be a non-issue. On the
other hand, if the taking of the samples is subjected to s.
8 Charter scrutiny, and the breath test results are found
to be admissible in evidence — either because no s. 8
breach occurred or because the evidence survived s.
24(2) Charter scrutiny — the shortcuts should remain
available to the Crown.1
(2) DEFENCES:

(A) MISTAKE OF AGE:
Section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code allows an accused
person charged with certain sexual offences, involving children less than sixteen years of age, to raise the defence of mistake of age. The section requires the accused to have taken all
reasonable steps to have ascertained the age of the complainant
before the defence can be applicable.

cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all
the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

In R. v. George, 2017 SCC 38, the accused was charged with
the offence of sexual interference. The trial judge acquitted the
accused based on having a reasonable doubt about whether the
Crown had proven that the accused had failed to take all reasonable steps to determine the complainant’s age. A majority of
the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, quashed the acquittals,
and ordered a new trial. The accused appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The appeal was allowed and the acquittals
restored.
The Supreme Court noted, at paragraph 8, that to
convict an accused person who demonstrates an “air of
reality” to the mistake of age defence, the Crown must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the
accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16 (the subjective element); or (2)
did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element).
The Supreme Court concluded that, in this case, a “review
of the trial judge’s reasons reveals no legal errors. As a result,
the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the
trial judgment” (at paragraph 15).
(B) OFFICIALLY INDUCED ERROR
In R. v. Bédard, 2017 SCC 4, the Supreme Court considered
the defence of officially induced error, though in a brief oral
judgment. The Court summarized the elements of the offence
in the following manner (at paragraph one):
The defence of officially induced error of law is intended
to protect a diligent person who first questions a government authority about the interpretation of legislation
so as to be sure to comply with it and then is prosecuted
by the same government for acting in accordance with
the interpretation the authority gave him or her.
(3) EVIDENCE:

(A) INFORMER PRIVILEGE
In R. v. Durham Regional Crime Stoppers Inc., 2017 SCC 45,
the police received a Crime Stoppers tip concerning a fatal
shooting. A few days later Keenan Corner was charged with
the offence of second-degree murder.
The Supreme Court of Canada noted, at paragraph 6, that at
the trial
[t]he Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking to
introduce evidence of the anonymous tip made to
Crime Stoppers. Prior to any rulings being made by the
application judge, the Crown disclosed to the defence
the anonymous tip and all relevant information about it
in its possession. The Crown maintained that the call
was made by Keenan Corner to divert attention away
from himself in the police investigation. It sought to
use the call at trial as evidence relevant to Keenan Corner’s general credibility . . . Keenan Corner denied making the call. In addition, he and Crime Stoppers submitted that the call was covered by informer privilege.

In response, the Crown
asserted that informer privilege did not apply to the
tip.
The application judge (at
paragraph 7):

“[S]hielding this
person’s identity
behind the
near absolute
protection of
informer
privilege would
compromise,
if not negate,
the privilege’s
objectives.”

found that Keenan Corner
had made the call and that
he had done so with the
intention of diverting attention away from himself in
the police investigation.
[The trial judge held] that
informer privilege did not
apply to the tip because its application would, in the circumstances, undermine the objectives which underlie
the privilege.

An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 2, that the primary
issue raised by this appeal was
whether informer privilege exists where a caller makes
an anonymous tip to Crime Stoppers with the intention
of interfering with the administration of justice. A secondary issue concerns the procedure to be followed
when the Crown challenges a claim of informer privilege
over an anonymous tip made to Crime Stoppers.
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that
informer privilege “does not exist where a person has contacted Crime Stoppers with the intention of furthering criminal activity or interfering with the administration of justice”
(at paragraphs 9 and 10):
As regards the primary issue, the application judge
excluded the tip from the scope of informer privilege on
the basis that Keenan Corner made the call to Crime
Stoppers in order to divert attention away from himself
in a police investigation. In my view, he did not err in
doing so. Informer privilege does not exist where a person has contacted Crime Stoppers with the intention of
furthering criminal activity or interfering with the
administration of justice. In such circumstances, shielding this person’s identity behind the near absolute protection of informer privilege would compromise, if not
negate, the privilege’s objectives.
With respect to the secondary issue, I am satisfied that
the procedure followed by the application judge was
reasonable. That said, this case provides the Court with
an opportunity to clarify the procedure that should be
followed and the safeguards that can be put in place
when the Crown challenges the applicability of
informer privilege over an anonymous tip made to
Crime Stoppers.
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What Is the Procedure to Be
Followed by a Court When
the Crown Challenges a Claim
of Privilege Over an Anonymous Tip?
The Supreme Court held
that when the Crown challenges a claim of privilege over
an anonymous tip, “the court
must consider whether privilege in fact exists at an in camera hearing” (at paragraph 35).
The Court also held, at paragraph 36, that the “in camera
hearing will likely require an ex
parte proceeding—in which the
accused and defence counsel
are excluded—to determine
whether informer privilege
applies to the tip.” Finally, the Court concluded that “the
application judge may review the record of the anonymous
tip” (at paragraphs 38-39).

The Court
held that
“[o]nly serious
misconduct can
justify such a
sanction against
a lawyer. . . .
[C]ourts must
be cautious . . .
in light of the
duties owed by
lawyers to their
clients . . . .”

(4) TRIALS:

(A) THE ORDERING OF COSTS AGAINST COUNSEL:
In Quebec (Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v.
Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26, an application judge awarded costs personally against defence counsel after dismissing counsel’s
applications for recusal of two trial judges on the basis of purported apprehensions of bias. On appeal, the Quebec Court of
Appeal set aside the award of costs against counsel. The
Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada restored the order of costs
made against defence counsel. The Court indicated that “[t]he
courts have the power to maintain respect for their authority.
This includes the power to manage and control the proceedings conducted before them . . . A court therefore has an inherent power to control abuse in this regard . . . .” (at paragraph
16). The Supreme Court also held that “[t]his power of the
courts to award costs against a lawyer personally is not limited
to civil proceedings, but can also be exercised in criminal cases
. . . . This means that it may sometimes be exercised against
defence lawyers in criminal proceedings, although such situations are rare . . . .” (at paragraph 19).
THE CRITERIA:
The Supreme Court indicated that “the threshold for exercising” the power to award costs against defence counsel personally “is a high one” (at paragraph 25). The Court held that
“[o]nly serious misconduct can justify such a sanction against
a lawyer. Moreover, the courts must be cautious in imposing it
in light of the duties owed by lawyers to their clients . . . .” (at
paragraph 25). The Supreme Court held that an award of costs
personally against counsel can only be ordered in “exceptional” circumstances (at paragraph 29).
THE PROCEDURE:
The Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 36, that when a
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court is considering issuing an order of costs personally
against counsel, the lawyer involved
should be given prior notice of the allegations against
him or her and the possible consequences. The notice
should contain sufficient information about the alleged
facts and the nature of the evidence in support of those
facts. The notice should be sent far enough in advance to
enable the lawyer to prepare adequately. The lawyer
should, of course, have an opportunity to make separate
submissions on costs and to adduce any relevant evidence in this regard. Ideally, the issue of awarding costs
against the lawyer personally should be argued only after
the proceeding has been resolved on its merits.
The Court also indicated that the Crown “must confine itself
to its role as prosecutor of the accused. It must not also become
the prosecutor of the defence lawyer” (at paragraph 38).
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE:
In applying these principles to this case, the Supreme Court
described the conduct of counsel in this case as being “particularly reprehensible” (at paragraph 42). It indicated, at paragraph 42, that the purpose of the applications were
unrelated to the motions he brought. The respondent
was motivated by a desire to have the hearing postponed
rather than by a sincere belief that the judges targeted by
his motions were hostile. . . . The respondent thus used
the extraordinary remedies for a purely dilatory purpose
with the sole objective of obstructing the orderly conduct of the judicial process in a calculated manner. It
was therefore reasonable for the judge to conclude that
the respondent had acted in bad faith and in a way that
amounted to abuse of process, thereby seriously interfering with the administration of justice.
(B) TRIALS: DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SCRUTINY OF THE
EVIDENCE:
In R. v. Awer, 2017 SCC 2, the accused was convicted of the
offence of sexual assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada the accused argued that the trial judge subjected a
defence expert to a higher level of scrutiny than the Crown’s
expert.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In a brief judgment, the Court
concluded that (at paragraphs 5-6):
[T]he materially different levels of scrutiny to which the
evidence of the two experts was subjected—none for the
Crown expert and intense for the defence expert—was
unwarranted, and it tended to shift the burden of proof
onto the appellant. . . . In these circumstances, we feel
obliged to quash the conviction and order a new trial.
(C) TRIALS: JOINDER OF PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL
OFFENCES:
In R. v. Sciascia, 2017 SCC 57, the accused was charged with
offences contrary to a provincial Highway Traffic Act and the

Criminal Code on separate informations (the Criminal Code
offence was proceeded with by way of summary conviction).
With the accused’s consent the two informations were tried
together in a single trial. The accused was convicted of a
provincial offence and a Criminal Code offence. He appealed
arguing that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct a
joint trial on the criminal and provincial charges and that his
trial was therefore a nullity.
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada
held that a Provincial Court judge has jurisdiction to conduct
a joint trial of a provincial charges and summary conviction
Criminal Code offence. The Supreme Court indicated that
“conducting a joint trial is both permissible and desirable
where the provincial charges and the summary conviction
criminal charges share a sufficient factual nexus and it is in the
interests of justice to try them together” (at paragraph one).
(D) JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE PENDING APPEAL:
In R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, the accused was convicted of
second-degree murder. Section 679 of the Criminal Code
allows for a convicted person to seek judicial interim release by
a single judge of the province’s Court of Appeal. An unsuccessful application can be reviewed by a panel of the Court of
Appeal.
In this case, a Judge of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
denied the accused’s application for release. A review by a
panel of three judges of the Court of Appeal upheld the denial
of bail. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court held that
the accused should have been released by the Court of Appeal
Judge and that the panel of the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the denial of bail. In the course of the ruling, the Supreme
Court considered sections 515(10)(c) [the public confidence
test for release consideration by trial judges]; 679(3)(c) [the
public confidence test for release by a single Judge of the Court
of Appeal pending an appeal]; and 680(1) [review of a section
679 decision by a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeal]
of the Criminal Code.
SECTION 679(3)(C):
The Supreme Court noted that in section 679(3)(c) of the
Criminal Code, “Parliament has not provided appellate judges
with any direction as to how a release pending appeal order is
likely to affect public confidence in the administration of justice” (at paragraph 31). However, “it has done so” under section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code (at paragraph 31). The
Court held that the four factors listed in section 515(10)(c),
“with appropriate modifications to reflect the post-conviction
context—should be accounted for in considering how, if at all,
a release pending appeal order is likely to affect public confidence in the administration of justice” (at paragraph 32).
The Supreme Court pointed out that in assessing public
confidence concerns pursuant to section 515(10)(c), “the seriousness of the crime plays an important role. The more serious
the crime, the greater the risk that public-confidence in the
administration of justice will be undermined if the accused is
released on bail pending trial” (at paragraph 37). The Supreme
Court concluded that in considering the public confidence
component under section 679(3)(c), “the seriousness of the

crime for which a person has been
convicted should . . . play an equal
role in assessing the enforceability
interest” (at paragraph 37).
SECTION 680(1):
The Supreme Court held that a
panel reviewing a decision of a
single judge under s. 680(1)
should be guided by the following
three principles (at paragraph 61):

“[A]dmitting a
statement by an
accused for the
purpose of
assessing the
constitutionality
of state action
. . . does not
engage the
rationale for the
confessions
rule.”

First, absent palpable and overriding error, the review panel
must show deference to the
judge’s findings of fact. Second,
the review panel may intervene
and substitute its decision for that of the judge where it
is satisfied that the judge erred in law or in principle, and
the error was material to the outcome. Third, in the
absence of legal error, the review panel may intervene
and substitute its decision for that of the judge where it
concludes that the decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Supreme Court, at paragraph 69, concluded that that
the appeal court judge
did not apply the correct test in assessing the strength of
Mr. Oland’s appeal and the implications flowing from it.
Much as he was satisfied that Mr. Oland had raised
“clearly arguable” grounds of appeal, this was not
enough. . . . [H]is reasons show[] he required more,
something in the nature of unique circumstances that
would have virtually assured a new trial or an acquittal[.]
(5) EVIDENCE:

(A) THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COMMON-LAW CONFESSIONS RULE TO STATEMENTS TENDERED IN A
VOIR DIRE UNDER THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:
In R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, the Crown sought to establish the reasonableness of a warrantless search by presenting
evidence on a Charter voir dire of things said to the police by
the accused before they entered his residence. An appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada raised the following issue: “the
applicability of the common law confessions rule to statements
tendered in a voir dire under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (at paragraph 1).
The accused argued that the Crown was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that any statements made by the
accused and upon which it relied to support the police entry
into the apartment, were voluntarily made (i.e., the “confessions rule”). The Supreme Court rejected this proposition. It
held, at paragraph 18, that “the confessions rule should not be
expanded as proposed by the appellant. More particularly . . .
the confessions rule should not apply to statements tendered
in the context of a voir dire under the Charter.” The Supreme
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It held that a
drug-recognition
expert’s
expertise had
been conclusively
and irrebuttably
established by
Parliament . . . .

Court held that (at paragraph
21):

[A]dmitting a statement by an
accused for the purpose of
assessing the constitutionality
of state action, as opposed to
the purpose of determining
the accused’s guilt, does not
engage the rationale for the
confessions rule. To apply the
rule to evidence presented at a
Charter voir dire would distort both the rule and its rationale.

(B) HEARSAY:
In R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, a witness (Thielen) provided a videotaped reenactment of two murders in which he
implicated the accused. Thielen refused to testify at the
accused’s trial. The Crown sought to admit into evidence his
reenactment. The trial judge admitted the reenactment and the
accused was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, the following issue was raised (at paragraph 18):
“When can a trial judge rely on corroborative evidence to conclude that the threshold reliability of a hearsay statement is
established?”
The Supreme Court held that (at paragraph 4):
[C]orroborative evidence may be used to assess threshold reliability if it overcomes the specific hearsay dangers
presented by the statement. These dangers may be overcome on the basis of corroborative evidence if it shows,
when considered as a whole and in the circumstances of
the case, that the only likely explanation for the hearsay
statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the
accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement. The
material aspects are those relied on by the moving party
for the truth of their contents.
However, the Court noted that (at paragraph 6):
[T]he evidence he relied on did not, when considered in
the circumstances of the case, show that the only likely
explanation was that Thielen was truthful about Bradshaw’s involvement in the murders. It did not substantially negate the possibility that Thielen lied about Bradshaw’s participation in the murders. While this corroborative evidence may increase the probative value of the
re-enactment statement if admitted, it is of no assistance
in assessing the statement’s threshold reliability. The trial
judge therefore erred in relying on this corroborative evidence.
(C) DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT EVIDENCE:
Section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code allows designated
police officers (referred to as “drug recognition experts”) to
demand that the operator of a motor vehicle submit to a drug
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evaluation (a series of physical tests designed to determine if
the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is impaired by a
drug).
In R. v. Bingley, 2017 SCC 12, the accused was involved in
a motor vehicle collision. A police officer, who was designated
as a drug recognition expert, conducted a “field sobriety test”
which led to the accused being charged with the offence of
operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the following
issue was raised (at paragraph 1): “Can a drug recognition
expert (‘DRE’) testify about his or her determination under s.
254(3.1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, without a
voir dire to determine the DRE’s expertise?”
The Supreme Court held that a voir dire was not required.
The Court indicated that while a trial judge would normally
determine whether an expert has special expertise at a voir dire,
section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code conclusively answered
the question. It held that a drug recognition expert’s expertise
had been conclusively and irrebuttably established by Parliament (at paragraph 20):
The DRE, literally, is a “drug recognition expert”, certified as such for the purposes of the scheme. It is undisputed that the DRE receives special training in how to
administer the 12-step drug recognition evaluation and
in what inferences may be drawn from the factual data he
or she notes. It is for this limited purpose that a DRE can
assist the court by offering expert opinion evidence.
(6) CHARTER:

(A) SECTION 8: SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES:
In Paterson, the police entered an apartment to seize several
marihuana roaches. The police told the accused they would
treat this as a “no case” seizure, meaning that they intended to
seize the roaches without charging him. Once inside, the
police observed a bulletproof vest, a firearm, and drugs. They
arrested the accused, obtained a warrant to search his apartment, and executed the warrant. This led to the discovery of
other firearms and drugs.
The accused was charged with various drug and firearm
offences. He was convicted at trial. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal of British Columbia upheld the convictions.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court described one of the issues raised by the appeal
as being (at paragraph 1): “[W]hether, on the facts of this case,
exigent circumstances, within the meaning of s. 11(7) of the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19
(“CDSA”), made it impracticable to obtain a warrant before
entering and searching the appellant’s residence[.]”
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals. The Supreme Court of Canada
held that the police entry into the appellant’s residence “was
not justified by exigent circumstances making it impracticable
to obtain a warrant” (at paragraph 4). The Court excluded the
evidence located by the search, pursuant to section 24(2) of
the Charter and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court held that (at paragraphs 33-34):
“[E]xigent circumstances” in s. 11(7) denotes not merely
convenience, propitiousness or economy, but rather
urgency, arising from circumstances calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or
public safety. . . . Even where exigent circumstances are
present, however, they are not, on their own, sufficient to
justify a warrantless search of a residence under s. 11(7).
Those circumstances must render it “impracticable” to
obtain a warrant.
The Court held, at paragraph 34, that the “impracticability
of obtaining a warrant does not support a finding of exigent
circumstances.”
The Court also held, at paragraphs 36-37, that the word
“impracticable” within the meaning of s. 11(7) contemplates that the exigent nature of the circumstances are
such that taking time to obtain a warrant would seriously
undermine the objective of police action—whether it be
preserving evidence, officer safety or public safety. . . . In
sum, I conclude that, in order for a warrantless entry to
satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown must show that the entry was
compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police
action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety.
Further, this urgency must be shown to have been such
that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives.
In the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that (at paragraph 39):
[T]he police had a practicable option: to arrest the appellant and obtain a warrant to enter the residence and seize
the roaches. If, as the Crown says, the situation was not
serious enough to arrest and apply for a warrant, then it
cannot have been serious enough to intrude into a private residence without a warrant.
The Supreme Court concluded, at paragraph 41, that “the
warrantless entry by the police into the appellant’s residence
was not authorized by s. 11(7) of the CDSA, and infringed his
right under s. 8 of the Charter to be secure against unreasonable search.”
(B) EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER SECTION 24(2):
Section 24(2) of the Charter allows a Canadian trial judge
to exclude evidence that “was obtained in a manner that
infringed” any of the provisions of the Charter if the admission
of the evidence “would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.”
In Paterson, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
obtained by the police was obtained in violation of section 8 of
the Charter should be excluded despite the seriousness of the
offences (at paragraphs 56-57):
It is therefore important not to allow the third Grant
2009 factor of society’s interest in adjudicating a case on

its merits to trump all other
“If . . . the
considerations, particularly
where (as here) the impugned situation was not
conduct was serious and
serious enough
worked a substantial impact
to arrest and
on the appellant’s Charter
apply for a
right. In this case, I find that
the importance of ensuring
warrant, then it
that such conduct is not concannot have
doned by the court favours
been serious
exclusion. As Doherty J.A.
enough to
also said in McGuffie, at para.
83, “[t]he court can only adeintrude into a
quately disassociate the jusprivate residence
tice system from the police
without a
misconduct and reinforce the
community’s commitment to
warrant.”
individual rights protected by
the Charter by excluding the evidence. . . . This unpalatable result is the direct product of the manner in which
the police chose to conduct themselves.”
Having considered these factors separately and together,
I am of the view that the evidence obtained as a result of
the entry and search of the appellant’s residence should
be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
(C) SECTION 11(B): TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME:
Section 11(b) of the Charter protects the right of an accused
person to be tried within a reasonable period of time. It states
as follows:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
....
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time[.]
In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in relation to section 11(b) of the Charter.
In that decision the Court created presumptive time frames (18
months for summary conviction offences and 30 months for
indictable offences), the breach of which will result in the staying of charges for unreasonable delay. In R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC
31, the Court had the opportunity to revisit Jordan, particularly
in relation to cases in which the charges had been laid prior to
Jordan being issued (referred to as “transitional cases”).
The Supreme Court held in Cody that the “new framework
in Jordan applies to cases already in the system. . . . However,
in some cases, the transitional exceptional circumstance may
justify a presumptively unreasonable delay where the charges
were brought prior to the release of Jordan” (at paragraph 67).
The Court indicated that (at paragraph 68):
[T]he transitional exceptional circumstance assessment involves a qualitative exercise. . . . The Crown may
rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can
show that “the time the case has taken is justified based
on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed” . . . Put another way, the Crown may show
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that it cannot be faulted for
failing to take further steps,
because it would have
understood the delay to be
reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the
way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness
of the offence and prejudice
would have been assessed
under Morin.
The Supreme Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was appropriate because the
Crown was unable to establish that the delay “was justified
based on its reliance on the previous state of the law” (at paragraphs 73-74):

or both. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the phrase
“imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment”
found in section 11(f) of the Charter primarily engaged the
deprivation of liberty inherent in the maximum sentence of
imprisonment imposed by the statute. The Court of Appeal
concluded that a maximum penalty of “five years less a day”
did not become a more severe penalty just because some collateral negative consequences were added to it.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court in R.
v. Peers, 2017 SCC 13, stated in a brief oral judgment (at paragraph 1): “The appeal is dismissed. We conclude that the
appellant was not entitled to a trial by jury, substantially for the
reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, 2015 ABCA
407, 609 A.R. 352.”

The charges in this case were serious. In our view, however, this consideration is overcome by the trial judge’s
findings of “real and substantial actual prejudice” . . .
The trial judge also made an express finding that Mr.
Cody’s conduct was not “inconsistent with the desire for
a timely trial” . . . .

(A) CONDITIONAL SENTENCES:
Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code allows a judge to order
that a period of imprisonment of less than two years be served
in the community under certain conditions (normally including “house arrest”). These sentences are referred to as “conditional sentences.”
In Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
the nature of conditional sentences in the following context (at
paragraph 2):

“In light of these
findings, the
Crown cannot
show that the
36.5 months of
net delay in this
case was
justified . . . .”

In light of these findings, the Crown cannot show that
the 36.5 months of net delay in this case was justified
based on its reliance on the previous state of the law. To
the contrary, the trial judge’s findings under the previous
law strengthen the case for a stay of proceedings. Where
a balancing of the factors under the Morin analysis, such
as seriousness of the offence and prejudice, would have
weighed in favour of a stay, we expect that the Crown
will rarely, if ever, be successful in justifying the delay as
a transitional exceptional circumstance under the Jordan
framework. We therefore find that the delay in this case
was unreasonable.2
(D) SECTION 11(F): THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
Section 11(f) of the Charter guarantees the right to trial by
jury. It states as follows:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
....
(f) except in the case of an offence under military
law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of
trial by jury where the maximum punishment for
the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more
severe punishment[.]
In R. v. Peers, 2015 ABCA 407 (Can. Alta.), the accused was
charged with an offence, contrary to section 194 of the Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4 (Can. Alta.). The maximum
penalty for a conviction under this provision was a period of
imprisonment of five years less a day, a fine of up to $5 million,

2. For a review of Cody, see Matthew R. Gourlay, After Jordan: The
Fate of the Speedy Trial and Prospects for Systemic Reform, 36:2
ADVOC. J. 22-27 (2017).
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(7) SENTENCING:

This appeal concerns the obligation of permanent residents to avoid “serious criminality”, as set out in s.
36(1)(a) of the IRPA [Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.]. This obligation is breached when
a permanent resident is convicted of a federal offence
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least 10 years, or of a federal offence for which a term of
imprisonment of more than 6 months has been imposed.
The Supreme Court made the following comments concerning the nature and purpose of conditional sentences (at
paragraphs 28, 32, 33):
[C]onditional sentences generally indicate less “serious
criminality” than jail terms. As Lamer C.J. said, a “conditional sentence is a meaningful alternative to incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous offenders” . . .
Thus, more serious crimes may be punished by jail sentences that are shorter than conditional sentences
imposed for less serious crimes—shorter because they
are served in jail rather than in the community. . . . Conditional sentences are designed as an alternative to incarceration in order to encourage rehabilitation, reduce the
rate of incarceration, and improve the effectiveness of
sentencing . . . .

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
a number of issues in 2017 related to criminal law and procedure. This included the defences of mistake of age (R. v.
George) and officially induced error (R. v. Bédard). In addition,
the Supreme Court commented upon conditional sentences
(Tran v. Canada), clarified the law of bail at the appellate level
(R. v. Oland), and considered the nature and extent of informer
privilege (R. v. Durham Regional Crime Stoppers Inc.). In the
constitutional context, the Court considered exigent circumstances in the law of search and seizure and when evidence
obtained in violation of the Charter should be excluded (R. v.
Paterson).
Finally, it is difficult to predict over the course of a year
which decision rendered by the Supreme Court will have the
most significant long-term effect. For the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2017, I would choose the Court’s decision in Cody.
In Cody the Court affirmed its groundbreaking and controver-

sial decision in Jordan. Cody provided the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to step back from Jordan or to affirm its
remarkable transformation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time in Canada. It chose the latter.
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Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
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Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
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Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
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The Calm Before the Storm?
Selected Criminal-Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2016-2017 Term
Charles D. Weisselberg & Whayeun Chloe Kim

L

ast year’s review was titled One Term, Two Courts, and it
noted some of the differences in the Court’s decision making before and after Justice Antonin Scalia’s passing.1 Justice Scalia’s replacement, Justice Neil Gorsuch, was sworn in
on April 10, 2017, too late to have an impact on the criminal
side of the 2016-2017 Term’s ledger. He participated in only
three of the twenty-two cases we discuss here,2 and none of his
votes was decisive. This was one Term, one Court.
Two characteristics mark the Term. One is a light criminallaw docket (with some significant rulings, but no blockbusters). The other is a relatively high degree of consensus— a
high percentage of unanimous opinions—as well as fewer merits cases determined by a single vote than in the five previous
Terms with a full Court.3 The October 2017 term may well be
different.
We will begin with two Fourth Amendment cases that may
illustrate the way in which an eight-member Court strove for
consensus.
FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court decided two civil-rights cases before
Justice Gorsuch joined the bench, issuing narrow holdings,
perhaps avoiding a deadlock. In Manuel v. City of Joliet,4 the
justices addressed the threshold question whether the Fourth
Amendment governs unlawful pretrial-detention claims even if
the detention occurs after the start of legal process. In County
of Los Angeles v. Mendez,5 the Court unanimously rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” in excessive-force claims,
holding that a different Fourth Amendment violation cannot
transform a reasonable use of force into an unreasonable
seizure.
UNLAWFUL PRETRIAL DETENTION
In Manuel, police officers searched Elijah Manuel during a
traffic stop and found a bottle of pills. According to Manuel,
police officers falsely claimed that there was evidence of
ecstasy, and a judge found probable cause to detain him based
on the officers’ claims. He brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that he was arrested unlawfully and detained

Footnotes
1. Charles D. Weisselberg and Juliana DeVries, One Term, Two
Courts: Selected Criminal-Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 20152016 Term, 52 COURT REV. 142, 150 (2016).
2. The three cases were McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790
(2017), Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), and Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726 (2017) (per curiam).
3. This Term, 41 decisions (59%) were unanimous and only seven
merits cases (10%) were decided by a single vote. By contrast, the
five terms before October 2015 had an average rate of unanimity
of 49% and an average of 22% of the merits cases decided by one
vote. See SCOTUSblog, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2016, at
5,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
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without probable cause. The Seventh Circuit found that a
detention following a legal process could not give rise to a
Fourth Amendment claim, holding that any claim would have
to be under the Due Process Clause. In a 6-2 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.6
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan explained that the
Supreme Court’s precedents reflect that “pretrial detention can
violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but
also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal
case.”7 If the legal process itself goes wrong—for example,
when a probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a
police officer’s false statements—the pretrial detention should
be challenged under the Fourth Amendment. Although the
Court addressed this “threshold inquiry” of which constitutional right is at issue, the Court did not define “the contours
and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim.”8 Notably, the Court left
open the question of whether the Fourth Amendment cause of
action continues to accrue throughout the period of detention,
which would be critical in determining whether Manuel’s
claim is time-barred.9
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.10
Although they agreed with the Court that the Fourth Amendment continues to apply after the start of legal process, they
would still have dismissed the unlawful-detention claim. They
also accused the majority of not addressing the critical questions in Manuel’s case: whether a malicious-prosecution claim
could be brought under the Fourth Amendment and whether
Fourth Amendment detention claims continue to accrue during pretrial detention.11
EXCESSIVE FORCE
Mendez involved a police shooting of two innocent individuals. Two deputy sheriffs entered a shack occupied by Angel
Mendez and Jennifer Garcia without a warrant and without
knocking or announcing their presence. Mendez, who had
been napping, rose from the bed and picked up a BB gun
nearby to place it on the floor. The deputies saw Mendez holding a gun and immediately opened fire. Mendez and Garcia
were shot multiple times. Mendez and Garcia brought a 42

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

SB_votesplit_20170628.pdf.
137 S. Ct. 911 (2017).
137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 915-17, 922.
Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 918.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 916, 920.
Id. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, he
wrote separately to argue that the issue of the accrual date should
have been left open for another case. Id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging several Fourth Amendment violations, including use of excessive force. The lower courts
found that the deputies acted reasonably in shooting to protect
themselves. Still, they determined that the officers used excessive force under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which
holds that an officer’s otherwise appropriate use of force is
unreasonable “if (1) the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response, and (2) that provocation is an independent constitutional violation” (such as entering without a
warrant).12 The Supreme Court reversed.
In a unanimous ruling, Justice Alito wrote that the provocation rule “is incompatible with our excessive force jurisprudence.”13 Courts should determine whether the force used is
reasonable by examining “whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of search or seizure.”14 This
inquiry is dispositive; if the officer carries out a seizure that is
reasonable based on the circumstances, there is no valid excessive-force claim.15 The provocation rule, however, would allow
an excessive-force claim if there was a different Fourth Amendment violation, such as entering without a warrant. The Court
decried the practice of “us[ing] another constitutional violation to manufacture an excessive force claim where one would
not otherwise exist.”16 Although the Court sharply criticized
the provocation rule, it stopped short of dismissing the case.
Instead, the justices sent the case back for further analysis of
the officers’ liability under an alternative theory.

what a hung count repreThe Court
sents.”18 By contrast, when there
are rationally irreconcilable ver- granted certiorari
dicts of both acquittal and conto decide . . .
viction, the acquittal has no
whether Ake
preclusive effect under the rule
[v. Oklahoma]
established in United States v.
19
Powell. The Bravo-Fernandez
requires the
case is more like Powell than
appointment of
Yeager, the Court held, because
an independent
the defendants could not show
defense expert
that the jury necessarily
resolved in their favor the ques[but] instead
tion of whether they violated the
decided a
bribery statute. We cannot
narrower
know which of the inconsistent
verdicts the jury really meant.
question.
And that the bribery convictions
were later vacated for instructional error does not change the
analysis since issue preclusion depends upon the jury’s assessment of the evidence in light of the allegations as presented at
trial.20 The Court thus declined an invitation to deviate from
the general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent reprosecution when a conviction is reversed for grounds
other than insufficiency of the evidence.21 Justice Thomas concurred to suggest that, in an appropriate case, the Court should
reconsider Yeager and a prior case, Ashe v. Swenson.22

FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

This was a significant part of the Term’s criminal-law
docket, with notable rulings on double jeopardy, expert assistance, compensation for wrongful convictions and disclosure
of exculpatory evidence.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Over the years, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
preclusive effect that may be given to inconsistent jury determinations. In Bravo-Fernandez v. United States,17 the defendants were convicted of federal-program bribery charges but
acquitted of conspiracy and other related offenses, which were
inconsistent verdicts. On appeal, their bribery convictions
were reversed due to an instructional error. Should the jury
acquittal prevent the government from retrying the defendants
on the bribery charges? A unanimous Court said no.
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, is a
primer on issue preclusion in criminal law. When a jury
returns a verdict of not guilty on some charges but fails to
reach a verdict on a different count that depends on the same
critical issue, Yeager v. United States provides that the hung
count may not be retried because “there is no way to decipher

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1546.
Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)).
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1546.
137 S. Ct. 352 (2016).
Id. at 357 (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121-22
(2009)).

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — ASSISTANCE OF EXPERTS
Ake v. Oklahoma23 is the foundational case on an indigent
defendant’s right to expert assistance. Ake establishes that
when an accused’s mental condition is relevant to criminal culpability and punishment, the State must provide a mentalhealth professional capable of “conduct[ing] an appropriate
examination and assist[ing] in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.”24 The Court granted certiorari in
McWilliams v. Dunn25 to decide whether Ake requires the
appointment of an independent defense expert. It instead
decided a narrower question.
James McWilliams was convicted of capital murder. At the
jury portion of the penalty phase, the prosecution called two
psychiatrists who had previously evaluated him for competency to stand trial. The defense subpoenaed mental-health
records from the facility where he was held, though the records
did not arrive before the jury recommended a sentence of
death. Prison records and a report from a neuropsychologist
employed by the State arrived two days before the sentencing
hearing. Although the defense had asked for a continuance and
for expert assistance to evaluate the materials, the requests

19.
20.
21.
22.

469 U.S. 57, 68 (1984).
137 S. Ct. at 363-64.
Id.
Id. at 366, 367 (Thomas, J., concurring) (addressing Yeager, supra,
and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
23. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
24. Id. at 83.
25. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
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were denied and the defendant
was sentenced to death. His
case reached the Supreme
Court on federal habeas corpus.
In a 5-4 decision authored
by Justice Kennedy, the Court
found that the state appellate
court’s decision was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable
application, of law clearly
established by Ake.26 Neither
the State neuropsychologist “nor any other expert helped the
defense evaluate [the] report or McWilliams’ extensive medical
records and translate these data into a legal strategy.”27 No one
helped the defense prepare arguments or testimony, nor did the
short time frame allow for more expert assistance.28 The
majority noted that, “[a]s a practical matter, the simplest way
for a State to meet this standard may be to provide a qualified
expert retained specifically for the defense team” and that
“appears to be the approach the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions have adopted.”29 However, the majority did not
need to reach the broader question whether an independent
expert is constitutionally required, since it was clear that that
McWilliams was denied the help of any expert.30 The Court
remanded for the Court of Appeals to address whether the
error required habeas relief to be granted.31
Justice Alito dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch.32 Criticizing the majority for
avoiding the broader question, these four justices would hold
that Ake left open whether due process requires the appointment of a defense-team expert as opposed to simply a neutral
expert, so McWilliams could not show that the state courts had
failed to follow clearly established law.33

[T]he justices ruled
that [Colorado’s
“Exoneration
Act”] failed to
afford a
constitutionally
adequate remedy.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — REFUND OF FEES, COSTS,
AND RESTITUTION
The petitioners in Nelson v. Colorado34 were two defendants
whose criminal convictions had been overturned. Shannon
Nelson was acquitted in a retrial that followed an appellate
reversal; Luis Alonzo Madden was not retried after his convictions were overturned. Nelson and Madden both sought return
of costs, fees, and restitution that they had paid.35 Colorado’s
“Exoneration Act” provides for refund only if a person affirmatively brings a civil claim and proves actual innocence of the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1801.
Id. at 1800.
Id. at 1800-01.
Id. at 1800.
Id.
Id. at 1801.
Id. at 1801 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1804, 1806. The dissenting justices also argued that the
majority decided the case on an issue for which review was
denied. Id. at 1806-07.
34. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
35. Id. at 1253.
36. Id. at 1254. The individual must also have served at least part of a
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offense by clear and convincing evidence.36 The Colorado
Supreme Court found that the Act affords the only process to
obtain a refund, and that it comports with the Due Process
Clause. Seven members of the Supreme Court disagreed.
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the justices ruled that
the Act failed to afford a constitutionally adequate remedy.
The majority measured the State’s procedures under the threepart test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,37 reasoning that
Mathews provides the appropriate framework since the challenge was to the continuing deprivation of property after a
conviction was reversed or vacated, and no further criminal
process is implicated. Applying Mathews, the former defendants’ “interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration
Act is unacceptable, and the State has shown no countervailing interests” in retaining the funds.38 They “should not be
saddled with any proof burden” since they are presumed innocent.39 The State “may not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a
conviction subsequently invalidated.”40
Justice Alito concurred, but would have analyzed the issue
under the due-process framework of Medina v. California,41
which applies to rules that are part of the criminal process.42 He
would have reached the same outcome under Medina for fines
and monetary penalties, drawing in part on historical practices.43 Noting that a restitution order is much like a civil judgment, however, Justice Alito would have held that refunds of
restitution awards are not constitutionally required, especially
awards that follow a final judgment later vacated on collateral
review.44 Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that there is no substantive right under the Due Process Clause to repayment of
funds that were lawfully paid to the State, and Colorado was
free to craft its own procedures, if any, for recoupment.45
The case may have a substantial impact. It clarifies which
due process test—Mathews or Medina—applies after the criminal process is completed. And, of course, it instructs states not
to impose more than “minimal procedures” for reimbursement
of fees when a conviction is invalidated.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — VAGUENESS
Two terms ago, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United
States46 and held that a residual clause in the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague.
The same language in the ACCA’s residual clause, defining a

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

term of incarceration for a felony conviction, and the conviction
must have been overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of
the evidence, or legal error not related to actual innocence. Id.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
137 S. Ct. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1258.
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
137 S. Ct. at 1258, 1258 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1263, 1265-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

“crime of violence” as involving conduct “that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” is in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and is one of the criteria that allows a
defendant to be sentenced as a career offender.47 The District
Court found that the defendant in Beckles v. United States48
qualified as a career offender under the Guidelines, and he
challenged the provision in light of the holding in Johnson.
Although the statute was void for vagueness, a majority of the
Court ruled that the relevant guideline was not susceptible to
such a challenge.
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Thomas
relied upon the justices’ earlier ruling in United States v. Booker,
which made the Guidelines “effectively advisory.”49 Reasoning
that “[b]ecause they merely guide the District Courts’ discretion, the Guidelines are not amenable to a vagueness challenge.”50 A defendant can challenge a sentence or a Guidelines
provision on other grounds, such as under the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Eighth Amendment in a capital prosecution, or the
Due Process Clause if a court uses materially false evidence to
sentence an uncounseled defendant.51 But since the Guidelines
do not fix the permissible range of sentences, and merely guide
the exercise of discretion within the sentencing range, they are
different from statutes.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result because the official
commentary to the challenged guideline expressly designated
Beckles’ offense as a crime of violence.52 Justice Sotomayor
agreed with Justice Ginsburg, but wrote separately to address
the majority’s vagueness ruling. She noted that while the
Guidelines were no longer binding, they play a central role in
federal sentencing, providing the framework for the thousands
of sentencing proceedings each year.53 Justice Sotomayor contended that a district court’s reliance on a vague guideline creates a serious risk of arbitrary enforcement, since the Guidelines functionally anchor the judge’s discretion. She also
queried how a guideline could be treated as formal law for Ex
Post Facto Clause and Eighth Amendment but not for a vagueness challenge.54

cution, the most important of
[T]he Court
which was the identity of a man
found that the
seen near the scene of the crime,
and who was arrested for attacks
suppressed
in the neighborhood shortly
evidence was
after the murder took place. The
“Brady
petitioners sought to tie that
together with other undisclosed information” since
evidence—noises heard by
it was favorable
another witness—which might
have supported a theory that the to the accused, as
offense was committed by a sin- either exculpatory
gle perpetrator, rather than a
or impeaching
group.56
evidence.
In a 6-2 ruling, authored by
Justice Breyer, the Court found
that the suppressed evidence was “Brady information” since it
was favorable to the accused, as either exculpatory or impeaching evidence.57 However, the majority agreed with the lower
courts that the withheld evidence was not material, and thus
the non-disclosure did not violate the Due Process Clause. The
guilt of a single other perpetrator would be inconsistent with
the petitioners’ guilt only if there was no group attack. Since
virtually every witness to the crime testified that it was a group
attack, the withheld evidence was insufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the jury’s verdict.58 Justices
Kagan and Ginsburg dissented.59 They did not disagree on the
law, but saw the potential impact of the withheld evidence differently, arguing that it could have changed the tenor of the
entire trial.60
In addition to these merits cases with full opinions, the justices issued a memorandum disposition worth a brief mention.
In Rippo v. Baker,61 the justices emphasized that the Due
Process Clause may require a judge to recuse himself even if he
has no actual bias. “Recusal is required when, objectively
speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’”62

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — BRADY MATERIAL
The Brady case—Turner v. United States55—arose from a
highly publicized murder prosecution in the District of Columbia. The seven petitioners were convicted on a theory that they
participated in a group attack upon the victim, who was robbed,
beaten, and sodomized. Decades later, they sought to vacate
their convictions based upon evidence withheld by the prose-
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47. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.1(a),
4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2006).
48. 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
49. Id. at 894 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
(2005).) Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion but noted
that the vagueness doctrine, which is concerned with giving fair
warning to an offender and preventing arbitrary enforcement,
cannot automatically be transferred to sentencing. Id. at 897, 897
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kagan did not participate in the
decision.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 895-96 (citations omitted).
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The Court handed down four significant Sixth Amendment
cases last Term. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,63 the Court
examined the impact of juror racial bias on a defendant’s right
to an impartial jury, and the evidence that can establish bias.
The justices also decided three noteworthy ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.

Id. at 897, 897-98 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 898, 899 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 901-03.
137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017).
Id. at 1891-93.
Id. at 1893.
Id. at 1894-95.
Id. at 1896 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1897.
137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (per curiam).
Id. at 907 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).)
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
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RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
JURY AND EVIDENCE OF BIAS
The Court has generally protected jury deliberations from
intrusive inquiry by barring a
criminal defendant from impeaching a verdict through juror testimony.64 In Pena-Rodriguez, the
Court recognized a constitutional
exception to the “no-impeachment rule” when there is clear
evidence of racial bias.
A Colorado jury convicted Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez of
unlawful sexual contact and harassment.65 After the verdict, two
jurors disclosed that a juror made racially biased statements during deliberations, including his belief that Mr. Peña-Rodriguez
was guilty because he is Mexican.66 Peña-Rodriguez brought a
motion for a new trial, but the trial court denied relief under
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Like its federal counterpart,
the Colorado evidentiary rule prohibited a juror from testifying
about a statement made during deliberations in a proceeding
inquiring into the validity of the verdict.67 The state’s appellate
courts affirmed. In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the
unique nature of racial bias. Unlike other types of jury bias,
“racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and
institutional concerns” and is “a familiar and recurring evil
that, if left unaddressed, would risk systematic injury to the
administration of injustice.”68 The Court also found racial bias
to be distinct in a pragmatic sense. Safeguards that generally
protect the right to an impartial jury, such as voir dire, may be
less effective in exposing racial bias and may even exacerbate
existing prejudice.69 Thus, where there is clear evidence of
racial bias, the Court held, the Sixth Amendment requires an
exception to the no-impeachment rule and permits “the trial
court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any
resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”70 But the Court
limited the scope of this exception. An offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility is not sufficient to overcome the
no-impeachment bar. Instead, “the statement must tend to
show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in
the juror’s vote to convict.”71
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
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64. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (refusing to
impeach a jury’s verdict in spite of evidence that some jurors were
under the influence of drugs and alcohol during the trial); Warger
v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (same where jury forewoman
failed to disclose her pro-defendant bias during voir dire). Of
course, even under the “no impeachment” rule, evidence is
admissible to show that extraneous prejudicial information or
outside influences were brought to bear. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
606(b).
65. Id. at 861.
66. Id. at 861-62.
67. Id. at 862.
68. Id. at 868.
69. Id. at 868-69.
70. Id. at 869.
71. Id.
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Thomas, dissented.72 He analogized the no-impeachment rule
to other well-established rules that limit a criminal defendant’s
ability to introduce evidence, and argued that the no-impeachment rule should not be cast aside lightly.73 Justice Alito also
wrote that the majority’s holding runs counter to the Court’s
precedents and prevents jurisdictions from developing their
own evidence rules to address juror bias.74
The full impact of the Court’s holding remains to be seen.
The majority took some comfort in the fact that 17 jurisdictions have already recognized a racial-bias exception.75 The
dissent noted, however, that it would be difficult to measure
the difference in the quality of jury deliberations in different
jurisdictions and expressed concern that the Court’s exception
will invite the harms that the no-impeachment rule was
designed to prevent.76
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Lee v. United States77 is the latest in a series of rulings about
effective assistance and the immigration consequences of a
conviction. Weaver v. Massachusetts78 addresses whether prejudice is presumed when a structural error is raised via an ineffective-assistance claim or whether the defendant must establish prejudice under the Strickland standard. And in Buck v.
Davis,79 the Court held that defense counsel’s decision to call a
witness, who testified that one’s race increases the probability
of future dangerousness, was both deficient and prejudicial.80
Jae Lee was charged with possessing ecstasy with intent to
distribute. After his attorney assured him that he would not be
deported, Lee accepted a plea agreement. But his attorney was
mistaken, and Lee was subject to mandatory deportation. The
lower courts rejected his ineffective-assistance claim; although
Lee established that his attorney acted deficiently, he could not
establish prejudice because there was overwhelming evidence
of guilt.81 In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began by
addressing two types of ineffective-assistance claims. Where a
defendant alleges that the attorney’s incompetence led to an
unreliable judicial proceeding, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”82 But sometimes a defendant
alleges that the counsel’s deficient performance led to the for-

72. Id. at 874, 874 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote
separately to argue that the Court’s holding contravenes the original understanding of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.
73. Id. at 875-77.
74. Id. at 878-81.
75. Id. at 870.
76. Id. at 884-85.
77. 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
78. 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
79. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
80. We are not addressing Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017),
which relates to procedural default.
81. Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963-64.
82. Id. at 1964 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984) and Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000)).

feiture of a proceeding itself, such as a trial. In these circumstances, prejudice can be demonstrated by “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”83 Here, Lee had repeatedly told his attorney that avoiding deportation was the determinative factor for him. Given
that accepting the plea agreement would certainly lead to
deportation, while going to trial would almost certainly lead to
deportation, it was not irrational for Lee to go to trial. Thus,
Lee adequately demonstrated prejudice.84
In a dissent joined by Justice Alito, Justice Thomas
strongly disagreed.85 He argued that Lee failed to demonstrate
prejudice because there was not a reasonable probability that
he would have obtained a more favorable result at trial given
the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the absence of a bona
fide defense.86 Justice Thomas warned that the majority’s
decision “will have pernicious consequences”87 by undermining the finality of decisions and imposing significant
costs. We note that this concern may be somewhat mitigated
by the majority’s admonition that judges should look to “contemporaneous evidence to substantiate”88 a defendant’s assertion that he would not have accepted a plea deal had he been
competently advised.
The defendant in Weaver was tried in a courtroom so small
that anyone who was not a potential juror was excluded from
the room during jury selection. Kentel Weaver’s counsel failed
to object to the closure at trial or on direct review, but Weaver
later filed a motion for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney’s failure to object
violated his right to a public trial. The state courts found that
Weaver failed to establish that the error was prejudicial.89 The
Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that
the case required the reconciliation of two doctrines: structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. A violation of
the right to a public trial is a structural error. If raised at trial
and on direct appeal, “the defendant is generally entitled to
automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the
outcome.”90 Here, however, the error was raised in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and prejudice is not presumed. When a defendant raises a public-trial violation
through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome . . . or . . . to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her
trial fundamentally unfair.”91 In the case at bench, Weaver
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question whether the closure of
the courtroom during jury selection should be considered a
Sixth Amendment violation at all.94 Justice Gorsuch joined
the majority and concurring opinions.
Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented.95 “[S]ome errors—
such as the public-trial error at issue in this case—have been
labeled structural because they have effects that are simply too
hard to measure.”96 Instead of requiring a defendant to take on
an impossible task or require lower courts to determine which
kinds of structural errors actually undermine fundamental fairness, the dissenters would grant relief as long as the defendant
can establish that an attorney’s constitutionally deficient performance produced a structural error.97
In the last of the three cases, Buck, the Court examined the
impact of race-based testimony at the penalty phase of a capital case.98 Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder. Under
Texas law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it
found that Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the
future. Defense counsel called a number of witnesses, including a psychologist, Dr. Quijano. Dr. Quijano prepared a written evaluation in which he stated that Buck was statistically
more likely to act violently in the future because he was black.
Nonetheless, Buck’s counsel called Dr. Quijano to the stand,
and he testified that Buck’s race was known to predict future
dangerousness.99 On cross-examination, Dr. Quijano emphasized that “the race factor, black, increases the future dangerousness for various complicated reasons.”100 The jury returned
a sentence of death, which was affirmed on appeal. While
Buck’s case was on collateral review, the Texas Attorney General issued a statement concerning capital cases in which Dr.
Quijano had testified, decrying the use of race in sentencing.
The Attorney General confessed error in a number of those
cases, but not Buck’s.101 Buck argued that his counsel was inef-
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93. Id. at 1914, 1914 (Alito, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 1916, 1916 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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99. Id. at 767-69.
100. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 770.

Id. at 1965 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
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fective for introducing the evidence. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts agreed.
Dr. Quijano’s report in effect
said that “the color of Buck’s skin
made him more deserving of execution” and, the Court found,
“[n]o competent defense attorney
would introduce such evidence
about his own client.”102 Buck also
established prejudice under
Strickland. Although Dr. Quijano
only referred to Buck’s race twice in his testimony, the Court
found that these references were not de minimis. Dr. Quijano’s
testimony tied the probability of future violence to the color of
Buck’s skin, an immutable characteristic. It also appealed to a
powerful racial stereotype. The harm to the defendant was significant whether Dr. Quijano was called as a witness by the
prosecution or the defense.103 In the procedural part of the decision, the majority also held that Buck was entitled to reopen his
federal habeas corpus case so that the lower courts could
address his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.104
Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the merits and
procedural holdings. They principally disagreed with the
majority’s finding of prejudice under Strickland, pointing to
the heinous nature of the crime and Buck’s lack of remorse.105
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EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The past Term saw one important ruling on the Eighth
Amendment, capital punishment, and intellectual deficits, as
well as two summary dispositions.
In Moore v. Texas,106 the Court examined whether a state
used the appropriate standard to determine if a defendant is
intellectually disabled and may not be executed under Atkins v.
Virginia.107 A state habeas court recommended granting relief
to Bobby James Moore, but the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals declined to adopt that recommendation, finding that
Moore failed to establish his intellectual disability.108 In an
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court reversed.
The justices held that the Texas court applied the wrong
standard for determining Moore’s intellectual disability. The
states have some flexibility, but not “unfettered discretion,” in
enforcing the ban on execution of intellectually disabled
inmates.109 Courts should look to the medical community and
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137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
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Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052-53 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1049.
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1998 (2014).
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048-50.
Id. at 1051-53.
137 S. Ct. at 1053, 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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“current medical standards” to inform their decisions.110 Here,
the Texas court failed to do so in two ways. First, in determining Moore’s intellectual functioning, the Texas court did not
properly adjust Moore’s IQ score of 74 by the test’s standard
error of measurement. This outcome was irreconcilable with
Hall v. Florida,111 which instructed courts to adjust IQ scores to
account for the inherent imprecision of the test. If the Texas
court had done so, Moore would have been placed within the
clinically established range for intellectual functioning
deficits.112 Second, in evaluating Moore’s adaptive functioning,
the Texas court deviated from prevailing clinical standards by
overemphasizing Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths rather
than his adaptive deficits; it also looked to Moore’s adaptive
strengths in a controlled setting, which clinicians caution
against. The Court also criticized the lower court for continuing to rely on a prior Texas case and its list of “evidentiary factors,” which are grounded on lay stereotypes and have not
been followed in any contexts other than the death penalty.113
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas,
dissented.114 Agreeing that the Texas evidentiary factors were
flawed, he still would have upheld the Texas court’s decision
because Moore’s IQ score was above 70.115 The Chief Justice
also criticized the majority for excessively relying on the medical standards and not providing adequate guidance to states
seeking to determine the bounds of intellectual disability.116
In addition to Moore, the justices also issued two summary
dispositions in Eighth Amendment cases. In Virginia v.
LeBlanc,117 the Court considered a follow-up to Graham v.
Florida,118 which requires states to give juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The Court ruled that under the deferential federal
habeas corpus standards, it was not objectively unreasonable
to find that Virginia’s geriatric release program met Graham’s
requirements.119 In the other summary disposition, Bosse v.
Oklahoma,120 the Court reversed a state court’s conclusion that
Booth v. Maryland121 was overturned. Booth prohibits a capital
sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence that
does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.”122
Payne v. Tennessee123 partially overruled Booth, but Booth
remains good law and still prohibits victim-impact evidence
that relates to characterizations and opinions about the crime
and the defendant.124 It is “this Court’s prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents.”125

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1057-58.
137 S. Ct. 1726 (2017) (per curiam).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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137 S. Ct. 1 (2016) (per curiam).
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
Id. at 501-02.
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137 S. Ct. at 2 (internal quotations omitted).

FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court also issued one of its first opinions to examine
the relationship between the First Amendment and the Internet, Packingham v. North Carolina.126
In 2002, North Carolina made it a felony for a registered sex
offender to access commercial social-networking websites that
allow minors to create accounts.127 Lester Gerard Packingham,
a registered sex offender, was convicted of violating this statute
after he wrote a Facebook post thanking God for dismissing
his traffic ticket.128 Packingham challenged his conviction on
First Amendment grounds, and a unanimous Court agreed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that “[a]
fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen.”129
The Court has historically protected the right to speak in
places that are important for the exchange of views, such as
streets or parks. Noting that cyberspace, and social media in
particular, fills a similar role, the Court wrote that it “must
exercise extreme caution” before limiting First Amendment
protections to such vast networks.130 The Court assumed that
the North Carolina statute was content-neutral.131 Thus, the
law was subject to intermediate scrutiny and must not “burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”132 Applying this standard, the
justices found that the government had a legitimate interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse, but the statute was
overly broad. Even if the Court were to limit the scope of the
statute to Facebook and other similar social networks, the
statute enacted an unprecedented prohibition on First Amendment speech.133 States, of course, are free to enact more specific
and narrow laws, such as prohibiting a sex offender from contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about
a minor.134
In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito expressed his disapproval of the majority’s “undisciplined dicta.”135 Although he agreed that the
North Carolina law was overly broad, he criticized the majority for equating the entirety of the Internet with public streets
and parks. Justice Alito focused on the fact that the the North
Carolina law encompasses a large number of websites that are
most unlikely to facilitate to commission of a sex crime against
a child, such as Amazon, the Washington Post, and WebMD.136
Limiting a registered sex offender’s access to such websites
would not appreciably advance the State’s goal of protecting
children from recidivist sex offenders.137
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ACTIONS — BIVENS
made it more
The justices also made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to
difficult for
bring civil-rights actions against plaintiffs to bring
federal officers under Bivens v.
civil-rights
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
138
139
Agents. In Ziglar v. Abbasi,
axctions against
the Court again addressed
federal officers
claims brought by non-citizens
under Bivens v.
who were held at the MetropoliSix Unknown
tan Detention Center in New
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tiffs, six men of Arab or South
Asian descent, alleged that their
detention under harsh conditions violated the substantive-dueprocess and equal-protection components of the Fifth Amendment, among other provisions.140 In a 4-2 ruling authored by
Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Bivens claim
against three high-level Department of Justice officials.
The majority held that separation-of-powers principles are
central to the question whether a party may assert a new
implied cause of action under the Constitution. Henceforth, “a
[new] Bivens remedy will not be available if there are ‘special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress.’”141 “Special factors” might include burdens on government employees, projected costs and consequences, or the existence of alternative remedial structures.142
Whether a case presents a new cause of action, rather than one
fitting within an already established Bivens context, may turn
on circumstances such as the officer’s rank; the right at issue;
the generality of the official action; existing judicial guidance
for the officer; the statute or other legal authority under which
the officer operated; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the
judiciary; and other factors.143 Because this case is meaningfully different from previous Bivens cases and because it necessarily implicates special factors, the Court refused to allow the
plaintiffs’ detention claims to proceed under Bivens.144
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that
the plaintiffs’ claims did not arise in a “new context” and were
not “expanding” the scope of the Bivens remedy.145 Even if the
context were “fundamentally different,” the dissent still would
have permitted the plaintiffs’ claims because no alternative
remedy was available for them, at least for a considerable time,
and there were no special factors that counsel hesitation.146
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Abbasi is a very important case for suits brought against federal officers. Abbasi has already been applied in Hernandez v.
Mesa,147 a closely watched case of a cross-border shooting by a
U.S. Border Patrol agent. There, the justices remanded to the
Court of Appeals to apply Abbasi and determine whether there
was an implied cause of action under Bivens.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION LAW

The Court decided three interesting federal criminal cases
on the scope of liability for criminal acts or forfeitures, plus
one about removability from the United States following a conviction for statutory rape. All four were unanimous decisions.
The defendant in Shaw v. United States148 was convicted of
“defraud[ing] a financial institution.” He argued that the statute
did not cover his conduct because he only sought to obtain
funds belonging to a bank depositor rather than the bank itself.
The Court rejected this claim, ruling that a bank has property
rights in accounts it holds and the statute does not require an
intent to cause the bank financial harm.149 Salman v. United
States150 holds that a conviction for insider trading under the
Securities and Exchange Act does not require that the tipper
receive something of pecuniary or like value in exchange for a
gift of information to family or friends. Honeycutt v. United
States151 addresses whether, under the federal drug-crime forfeiture statute, a defendant convicted in a conspiracy may be
held jointly and severally liable for property that a co-conspirator derived from the crime. After noting that joint and several
liability is a creature of tort law, the justices found that forfeiture under the federal statute is limited to property that the
defendant actually acquired as a result of the crime.152
The question in the immigration case, Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions,153 was whether a conviction under a statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and
a 17-year-old is an “aggravated felony” and grounds for
removal from the United States. In making that determination,
a court takes a categorical approach—examining the statute of
conviction (not the conduct)—and decides whether the least
of the criminalized conduct fits within the federal definition of
the crime. The Court determined that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based
solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be
younger than 16.”154 Thus, “[a]bsent some special relationship
of trust, consensual sexual conduct involving a younger partner who is at least 16” is not an aggravated felony supporting
removal “regardless of the age differential between the two participants.”155

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
137 S. Ct. 462 (2016).
Id. at 466-67.
137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017).
Id. at 1631, 1635.
137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
Id. at 1568.
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THE CURRENT TERM

If the 2016-2017 Term was a bit of a snoozer, the 2017-2018
may have a blockbuster docket—and the Court is fully constituted. The past Term may have been the calm before a coming
storm. The justices will consider whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when compelled statements are used at a
probable-cause hearing, but not at trial;156 whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatoryarrest claim;157 and whether defense counsel can concede an
accused’s guilt at trial over the accused’s express objection.158
But the Court’s Fourth Amendment docket has captured much
attention, and rightfully so.
The most significant criminal-law case in the current Term
may well be Carpenter v. United States,159 which asks whether
officers need a warrant to obtain historical cell-site records. In
Carpenter, investigators went to a service provider and
acquired 127 days of Carpenter’s call records, as well as the
locations of the cell towers to which his phone connected. The
records contained an average of 101 location points per day for
more than four months’ time. The evidence was used to place
Carpenter near the scene of four robberies. The case may give
the Court an opportunity to consider the application of the
“third-party doctrine” to longer-term cell-site location information. In addition to Carpenter, the Court will also weigh
whether an officer may enter private property without a warrant to search a vehicle parked a few feet from a house,160 and
whether a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
rental car when he has the renter’s permission to drive but is
not listed on the rental agreement.161
Stay tuned for a very eventful Term with a new Court!
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How Judges Can Reduce
Racial Disparities in the
Criminal-Justice System
Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter

F

or decades, researchers and policymakers have been concerned about the disproportionate presence of blacks and
Latinos in the criminal-justice system.1 While a fairly substantial proportion of these racial disparities can be explained
by greater criminal involvement among blacks and Latinos in
certain crimes,2 researchers continue to find that, even after
controlling for differences in criminal behavior and other
legally relevant factors, minorities are treated more punitively
than similarly situated whites from arrest to sentencing in
numerous jurisdictions.3 Consequently, researchers suggest
that racial disparities arise not just from disproportionate criminal involvement or the disparate impact of facially neutral
laws but also from differential treatment by criminal-justice
officials, such as police officers, lawyers, probation officers,
and judges.
While researchers have theorized how criminal-justice officials’ biases and stereotypes may result in differential treatment,4 researchers have little understanding of how officials
make sense of the social problem of racial disparities and how,
if at all, they work to address the problem.
From December 2013 to March 2015, we interviewed 59
state-level judges in a Northeastern state, where blacks and
Latinos are disproportionately represented in the criminal-justice system. Although blacks and Latinos each comprised less
than 10 percent of the state population in 2014, they each
comprised about 25 percent of its incarcerated population. We
sought to interview judges from a range of professional, racial,
and gender backgrounds since existing literature has found
these characteristics to be relevant in explaining judges’ vary-

ing philosophies, views of defendants,5 and observed decision
making.6 We continued recruiting respondents until we no
longer obtained novel information from our interviews.7 For
additional insight, we also interviewed prosecutors, public
defenders, and private attorneys, and we did fieldwork within
upper and lower courthouses across the state. Our interviews
focused on court officials’ decision making from arraignment
to sentencing. A thorough analysis of our findings is presented
in a peer-reviewed journal article published in an academic
criminology journal.8 In this article, we summarize the key
takeaways for judges from this study.

Footnotes
1. JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN & STEVE REDBURN, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2014).
2. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME &
JUSTICE 311–74 (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE,
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
3. Cassia Spohn, Racial Disparities in Prosecution, Sentencing, and
Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND
IMMIGRATION (Sandra M. Bucerius and Michael Tonry eds., 2013);
Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug
and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUSTICE
1–44 (2008).
4. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich &
Chris Guthrie. Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges? 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195–246 (2009); Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer & John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and
Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young,
Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 763–798 (1998); Jeffery T.

Ulmer, Recent Developments and New Directions in Sentencing
Research, 29 JUSTICE Q. 1–40 (2012).
CASSIA C. SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT (2009).
Brian D. Johnson, The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing:
Integrating Judge- and County-Level Influences, 44 CRIMINOLOGY
259-98 (2006).
Mario Luis Small, “How many cases do I need?” On Science and the
Logic of Case Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 538 (2009).
Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think about Racial
Disparities: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332-59 (2016).
Although we interviewed 59 judges in total, our interview guide
evolved during data collection; consequently, some judges were
not asked all of our questions about racial disparities. These
judges were removed from our analysis, resulting in a sample of
55 judges with respect to beliefs about the causes of racial disparities and 48 judges with respect to strategies for dealing with disparities.
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JUDGES’ EXPLANATIONS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES

A nontrivial number of the judges we interviewed (13 of 55,
24%)9 attributed racial disparities to differences in criminal
offending rates alone, often highlighting the roles of poverty
and family dysfunction in shaping defendants’ criminal trajectories before contact with the criminal-justice system. These
judges attributed disparities to the disparate impact of facially
neutral laws that criminalize behaviors in which they believe
blacks and Latinos happen to be disproportionately involved
because of their socioeconomic positions and the neighborhoods in which they live. As one judge noted, “[T]here seems
to be almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy for a lot of young
black men . . . that it is OK to go to [jail], that it is a badge of
honor. . . . Sometimes they want to go because that’s where
their best friend is.”
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the majority of judges in our
sample (42 of 55, 76%) attributed racial disparities, at least in

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

part, to differences in treatment by court officials or police officers at some point along the criminal-justice process. Many of
these judges believe that court and law-enforcement officials,
including themselves, might have implicit biases against people
of color. As one judge noted, “We’re all vulnerable to prejudice.” These judges also attributed disparities to what they
believed to be police officers’ and departments’ differentially
harsh enforcement of laws in majority-minority neighborhoods.

recommends when he or she perceives a disparate pattern of
bail requests for non-legal reasons. Through such interventionist strategies at arraignment, judges seek to ensure that
“people [from different racial/ethnic groups] are treated
equally.”
State judges who employ interventionist strategies recounted
taking the following steps to mitigate racial disparities:
At arraignment, judges reported keeping records of
the types of situations/defendants attached to particular
charges. Based on these records, judges reported actively
inquiring into disparities in charging decisions.
At bail hearings, judges reported soliciting detailed
information about the socio-economic status (SES) of
defendants when not already available, so as to set
informed bail amounts that will ensure defendants
return for trial.
At the plea stage, judges reported keeping records of
the types of situations/defendants typically attached to
particular dispositions. Based on these records, judges
reported actively inquiring into the nature of agreed-on
pleas that appeared disparately punitive.
At jury selection, judges reported keeping tallies of
the presence of potential minority jurors in the jury pool
and actively questioning whether racial bias may be
involved in their own removal of a minority juror for
cause and/or in counsel’s peremptory strike of a minority juror.
Judges reported choosing a minority juror as the
foreperson of the jury when possible, especially when
the defendant is a minority.
At sentencing, judges reported considering the merits
of a “social adversity” defense,10 whereby they account
for mitigating factors such as poverty and racial discrimination that may have contributed to the convicted
defendant’s criminal behavior. This enables judges to
give broader consideration to why a black or Latino
defendant may have a lengthier criminal record than a
white defendant charged with the same crime.
Judges reported considering creative ways to make
alternative sentences—such as drug rehabilitation—as
available to low-SES defendants as they are to their more
affluent peers.
At each stage of the criminal-court process that we examined, only a small number of judges in our sample reported

JUDGES’ STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH RACIAL
DISPARITIES

Judges reported two groupings of strategies for dealing with
racial disparities at different stages of the criminal-court
process. We define these two sets of strategies as “noninterventionist” and “interventionist.”
Noninterventionist strategies defer to other actors (e.g.,
prosecutors and defense attorneys) in decision making. These
strategies usually involve judges considering their personal
biases and potential differential treatment of defendants, but
not addressing possible differential treatment by other actors
or the disparate impact of their own decisions or of the criminal-justice process as a whole.
Interventionist strategies, by contrast, contest other actors
in decision making. These strategies usually involve judges not
only considering their own differential treatment of defendants
but also questioning possible differential treatment by other
actors, as well as (sometimes) addressing the disparate impact
of their own decisions and of the criminal-justice process as a
whole.
Each set of strategies manifests in particular ways at particular stages of the criminal-court process—from arraignment to
plea negotiation to jury selection to sentencing. For example,
at arraignment, a judge employing a noninterventionist strategy defers to prosecutors in bringing charges and to both prosecutors and defense attorneys in the setting of bail, often setting bail in between the recommendations of each side. At this
stage, judges employing a noninterventionist strategy often
feel that prosecutors and defense attorneys have more information about the case than they do and it would, therefore, be
“out of line” to “weigh in,” as one judge told us. By contrast, a
judge employing an interventionist strategy at arraignment
may keep records of prosecutors’ differential charging histories, dismiss a charge on the basis of differential treatment, or
set a lower bail amount than either the defense or prosecution

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF JUDGES EMPLOYING EACH STRATEGY CATEGORY, BY STAGE (N=48)

ARRAIGNMENT

PLEA HEARING

JURY SELECTION

SENTENCING

Interventionist

12

7

13

7

Noninterventionist

36

41

35

41

Source: Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think about Racial Disparities: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54
CRIMINOLOGY 332-359 (2016).

10. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten social background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?,

3 LAW & INEQUALITY 9–90 (1985).
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TABLE 2. JUDGES BY NUMBER OF STAGES AT WHICH THEY EMPLOY AN INTERVENTIONIST STRATEGY (N=48)

INTERVENTIONIST
AT 0 STAGES

INTERVENTIONIST
AT 1 STAGE

INTERVENTIONIST
AT 2 STAGES

INTERVENTIONIST
AT 3 STAGES

INTERVENTIONIST
AT 4 STAGES

23

15

7

2

1

Source: Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think about Racial Disparities: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54
CRIMINOLOGY 332-359 (2016).

employing interventionist strategies that would mitigate possible differential treatment by other criminal justice officials
(Table 1). Indeed, a plurality of judges in our sample (23 of 48,
48%) did not employ interventionist strategies at any of the
four stages of court processing we examined (Table 2).
IMPLICATIONS: HOW MIGHT JUDGES CONTRIBUTE TO
RACIAL DISPARITIES?

The judges we spoke with did not express explicitly racist
attitudes, at least not in the interview setting or in courthouse
observations. This finding stands in contrast to qualitative
research on judges conducted in the 1980s11 and in contemporary court systems in some states.12 Moreover, many judges
acknowledged that they may have racial and class biases that
may contribute to racial disparities. And as noted earlier, most
judges in our sample believed that racial disparities arise from
at least some form of differential treatment by criminal-justice
officials.
Although most judges in our sample exhibit well-intentioned judging, the overwhelming use of noninterventionist
strategies by these judges (Tables 1 and 2) likely contributes to
racial disparities. Most judges in our sample found it appropriate to account for only their own possible differential treatment of criminal defendants (noninterventionist) and not that
of other actors nor the disparate implications of poverty and
racial inequality before contact with the criminal-justice system (interventionist). By deferring to other actors in the sys-

11. See e.g., George S. Bridges, Robert D. Crutchfield, & Edith E.
Simpson, Crime, Social Structure and Criminal Punishment: White
and Nonwhite Rates of Imprisonment, 34 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 345–61
(1987).

tem, judges who employ noninterventionist strategies may
unintentionally allow for the reproduction of racial disparities
that emanate at earlier stages of the criminal-justice process,
such as through the actions and possible biases of the police,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, as well as through the
social adversities faced by many black and Latino criminal
defendants. However, by employing interventionist strategies,
a small number of judges more actively work to combat disparity-producing legal practices, policies, and decisions.

Matthew Clair is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology
at Harvard University and a Quattrone Center
Research Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. His current research centers on
the causes and consequences of racial and
socioeconomic disparities in the criminal-justice system.
Alix S. Winter is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology
and social policy at Harvard University and a
doctoral fellow in the Harvard Kennedy
School's Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy. Her current research
examines links between social and environmental inequality, crime, and the criminal-justice
system.

12. See, e.g., NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM
AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016).

AJA FUTURE CONFERENCES
2018 MIDYEAR
MEETING

2018 ANNUAL
CONFERENCE

2019 MIDYEAR
MEETING

MEMPHIS,
TENNESSEE

LIHUE, HAWAII
(ISLAND OF KAUAI)

SAVANNAH,
GEORGIA

The Guest House
at Graceland

Kauai Marriot Resort

Savannah Marriot
Riverfront

April 19-21
$145 single/double

September 22-27
$219 single/double

April 18-20
$189 single/double

For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences
160 Court Review - Volume 53

R-E-S-P-E-C-T:
Transgender Pronoun Preference and the
Application of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Francesco G. Salpietro

A

mnesty International—a civil-rights organization that
“work[s] to protect people wherever justice, freedom,
[and] truth . . . [have been] denied”1—put it best in
its mission statement: “We all have a sexual orientation and a
gender identity, and this shared fact means that discrimination
against members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual[,] and Transgender community, based on sexual orientation and/or gender
identity, is an issue that transcends that community and affects
all of us.”2 Fundamental to this communal conception are
notions of dignity and respect, both of which are to be enjoyed
by all people of all backgrounds. When transgender individuals litigate in court, the adversarial system sometimes ignores
these basic dignities and instead gives way to practices that
impede upon such individuals’ ability to freely express themselves in a manner consistent with their own identities. Moreover, under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and its various state codifications, judges must rely upon traditional
notions of justice, judicial integrity, impartiality, and respect3
to ensure that transgender persons enjoy the same rights as do
other members of society.
This Note addresses this issue and responds with a set of
proposed solutions. Part I introduces a potential problem
faced by judges when addressing transgender individuals in
court proceedings after being presented a set of conflicting
pronouns—individuals’ preferred gender pronouns and those
that do not match these individuals’ true identities—and
includes a brief discussion of relevant case law. Part II applies
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to the general fact pattern

Editor’s Note: An earlier version of this article was the winning entry
in a writing competition sponsored by the International Association
of LGBT Judges. The Association then submitted the article to Court
Review for publication consideration.
Author’s Note: Thanks to the International Association of LGBT Judges
for their invaluable feedback. All errors are my own.
Footnotes
1. About Us, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/about-us
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
2. Gender, Sexuality, & Identity, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.
amnestyusa.org/issues/gender-sexuality-identity (last visited Dec.
11, 2017). This particular mission statement relates to Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Human Rights and is one
of several “Human Rights Issues” for which Amnesty International
serves. Id.
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
4. Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks
Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradleymanning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-
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outlined in Part I and articulates relevant ethical canons,
rules, and comments that may give rise to disciplinary violations. Part III provides a set of solutions to this problem,
including better educating the courts in areas of LGBT cultural competency and sensitivity, adopting local court rules or
standards with respect to LGBT issues, and promulgating
amendments to to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to better address the ethical dilemmas surrounding transgender
individuals in court.
IT STARTS WITH A PRONOUN—CASE LAW

On August 21, 2013 a military judge convicted former Army
Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning to 35 years in
prison for voluntarily disclosing classified documents to Wiki
Leaks.4 The next day, PFC Manning issued a public statement
in response to the court’s conviction on NBC’s Today show,
including a shocking announcement: “I am Chelsea Manning. I
am a female.”5 Manning’s announcement prompted nationwide
discord as to how to properly address the former military private, now a transitioning transgender individual.6 While some
media outlets referred to Manning with masculine pronouns,7
others consistently referred to Manning in the feminine form.8
This debate ultimately prompted Manning to file a court
motion upon appeal of her conviction, asking the court to use
“[her] legal name, Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, [] to preclude
[her] former name, Bradley Edward Manning, and to use female
pronouns in reference to [Manning], in all future formal
papers” filed with and issued by the U.S. Army Court of Crim-

476db8ac34cd_story.html.
5. Aaron Blake & Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Comes Out as Transgender: ‘I am a Female’, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013),
h t t p s : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / w o r l d / n a t i o n a l security/bradley-manning-comes-out-as-transgendered-i-am-afemale/2013/08/22/0ae67750-0b25-11e3-8974f97ab3b3c677_story.html(quoting an official statement made by
Chelsea Manning).
6. Paul Farhi, Media Wrestles with How to Refer to Manning, WASH.
POST (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/media-wrestles-with-how-to-refer-to-manning/2013/
08/22/60dc0f0c-0b44-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
7. Id. (citing to the Christian Science Monitor’s use of the pronoun,
“he,” as well as the Washington Post’s “early articles,” which drew
serious criticism by members of Twitter).
8. Id. (citing to ABCNews and the Today show, both of which used
the pronoun, “she,” to refer to Manning). Other news outlets,
such as CNN and later articles published by the Washington Post,
avoided the question altogether, couching discussions of Manning
in gender-neutral forms, including “Manning,” “former Army private,” and “intelligence analyst.” Id.

inal Appeals (ACCA).9 Notwithstanding public knowledge of
this gendered-pronoun controversy, the motion, itself, contained no substantive justification for the request.10 Accordingly, the government filed a motion in response asking for justification, and Manning responded.11 In her reply, Manning
argued that referring to her in the feminine form would not
cause confusion for the court and was required by the interests
of justice.12 First, Manning cited to her own psychological condition, gender dysphoria, for which the government’s own medical professional consistently referred to her “as female and
use[d] female pronouns when referring to [Manning].”13 Next,
Manning argued that the weight of authority supported the
grammatical use of her “[c]orrect [g]ender, which is [f]emale,”
since other courts traditionally deferred to transitioning individuals by using their preferred gender pronouns.14 Finally,
Manning argued that, based on medical consensus, “[f]ailure to
honor a person’s gender on legal documents [would be] tantamount to erasing a core part of their identity and [would] be
damaging to treatment outcomes and mental health of persons
with gender dysphoria.”15 As such, Manning contended that

justice demanded a ruling in her
Some
favor.16
commentators
A three-judge panel, writing
for the ACCA, agreed with Man- contend that this
ning.17 Without justification, the was the first time
panel demanded that “[r]eference to [Manning] in all future a court expressly
formal papers filed before this
ruled on a
court and all future orders and
transgenderdecisions issued by this court
pronoun
shall either be neutral, e.g., Priissue . . . .
vate First Class Manning or
appellant, or employ the feminine pronoun.”18 Some commentators contend that this was
the first time a court expressly ruled on a transgender-pronoun
issue,19 and many transgender-rights organizations applauded
the ACCA for its acceptance of Manning’s pronoun preference:
this practice is in accordance with the Gay and Lesbian Association Against Defamation (GLAAD)20 and is further
endorsed by Lambda Legal—a legal advocacy group “whose

9. Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s Legal Name and to Preclude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name in All Court Documents, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY 20130739 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Name Change Recognition
Motion]. The Pentagon released a comprehensive set of pleadings,
motions, opinions, and orders pursuant to a series of Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests demanding full disclosure of
Manning’s first trial. Adi Robertson, Pentagon Releases Trial Documents as Bradley Manning Prepares Formal Plea, THE VERGE (Feb.
27,
2013),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/27/4036448/
pentagon-releases-trial-documents-as-bradley-manning-preparesformal/in/3801093. These documents can be found by searching
the Army’s FOIA library. Rec. Mgmt. & Declassification Agency,
RMDA Freedom of Information Act Library, U.S. ARMY,
https://www.foia.army.mil/ReadingRoom/Detail.aspx?freeText=ma
nning (last visited May 14, 2016).
10. See Name Change Recognition Motion, supra note 9.
11. Response to Appellant’s Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s
Legal Name and to Preclude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name
in All Court Documents, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY
20130739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2015); Reply to Government
Response to Appellant’s Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s
Legal Name and to Preclude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name
in All Court Documents, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY
20130739 (Feb. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Manning Reply].
12. Manning Reply, supra note 11, at 2.
13. Id. at 2–3 (citing internal court filings).
14. Id. at 4 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2000); Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401, 410 n.1
(6th Cir. 1997); Merriweather v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 408 n.1
(7th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 n.2
(N.D. Iowa 1999); and Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me.
2014)).
15. Id. at 5 (referencing the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, the American Medical Association, the Endocrine
Society, and the American Psychological Association). Note that
the singular “their” is often used as a third-person singular possessive adjective to reflect the non-binary nature of gender and
sexuality; its use is also preferred by many gender non-conform-

ing individuals. Avinash Chak, Beyond ‘He’ and ‘She’: The Rise of
Non-Binary Pronouns, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34901704.
16. Manning Reply, supra note 11, at 5.
17. Order, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY 20130739 (Mar. 5,
2015) [hereinafter Preferred Gender Pronoun Order]. Note that,
unlike state or federal judges who are either elected or appointed
and subsequently confirmed by the legislative branch, the military
judiciary functions differently:
[T]he military judge . . . is appointed by the Judge
Advocate General [] of the appropriate armed service, serves
without a fixed term at the pleasure of the Judge Advocate
General, and is evaluated at least annually by senior officers.
Subsequent promotion and reassignment are dependent
upon the judge’s annual officer evaluation and the personal
knowledge and desires of those senior officers responsible
for assignments.
Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent
Military Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 629, 630 (1994). Military
judges are nevertheless still subject to their own judicial code of
conduct that mirrors that of the American Bar Association’s Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR
ARMY TRIAL & APPELLATE JUDGES (U.S. ARMY JUDICIARY 2008).
18. Preferred Gender Pronoun Order, supra note 17, at 1–2. Note that
the panel added a parenthetical qualifier to Manning’s original case
name: “nka Chelsea E. Manning.” Id. In the legal context, the
acronym “nka” stands for “now known as.” AM. SOC’Y NOTARIES,
IDENTIFYING THE SIGNER 1–2 (2005), at http://www.asnotary.org/
img/Identifying%20the%20Signer.pdf.
19. Miranda Leitsinger, Army Must Refer to Chelsea Manning as a
Woman, Not Man: Court, NBCNEWS (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/army-must-refer-chelseamanning-woman-not-man-court-n318286.
20. GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Transgender Issues, GLAAD,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited May 14,
2016); Farhi, supra note 6.
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mission is to achieve full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, [and] transgender people . . . .”21
Despite the ACCA’s deferential
respect for Manning’s pronoun
preference, especially given her
formal name change, other courts
have not been so willing to
endorse a transgender party’s preferred gender pronouns in court
proceedings. While certainly not
the norm,22 some courts refuse to
defer to a transgender individual on that individual’s preferred
mode of expression. For example, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin recognized that a transgender plaintiff filed an action under her chosen name, but, since
she “remain[ed] a biological male,” utilized male pronouns for
ease of discussion.23 Additionally, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, although “recogniz[ing] that it is
painful for [the plaintiff] to be referred to as ‘he’ and that
courts have, at times, referred to male transsexuals as ‘she,’”
nevertheless referred to the plaintiff in the masculine form for

the sake of administrative clarity.24 More unpalatably, one
immigration-law judge has been reported to have said, in the
context of an appeal of a denial of a claim for asylum, that
“referring to a transgender woman by her preferred gender
pronouns was like actor Paul Reubens requesting to use his
stage name Pee-wee Herman . . . .”25 By failing to respect a
transgender individual’s gender-pronoun preference, these
judges seem to perpetuate transphobia in modern culture, and,
in wake of an individual’s express request to use their preferred
gender pronouns, may also violate the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct, especially in the
context of local, state, and federal anti-discrimination laws.

21. About Us, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017); Know Your Rights in Court, LAMBDA
LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/in-court/faq
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
22. In a comprehensive search for court orders specifically discussing
gender-pronoun preferences of transgender individuals, most
courts do, in fact, defer to an individual’s preferred gender pronouns. See Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 959 n.1 (10th Cir.
2001) (“Although a biological male, [plaintiff] considers herself to
be a female and uses the feminine pronoun in referring to herself.
In deference to her wishes, this opinion will do the same.”); Levy
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. TDC-14-3678, 2016 WL
865364, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2016) (“Because [plaintiff] identifies as female, the [c]ourt will use the feminine pronoun to refer
to her.”); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 n.1 (D.
Mass. 2012) (“Although [p]laintiff is biologically male, the court
will refer to her using feminine pronouns in deference to her
expressed gender identity.”); Inscoe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-001588
DLB PC, 2009 WL 3617810, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009)
(“Plaintiff uses the feminine pronoun for self-identification, which
the [c]ourt will use here.”); Houston v. Trella, No. 04-1393 (JLL),
2006 WL 2772748, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006) (“Because
[p]laintiff is a transsexual and identifies herself as feminine, the
[c]ourt will use the feminine pronoun when referencing [p]laintiff.”); Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 n.4
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (“This [c]ourt will use female pronouns when referring to plaintiff: a practice which is consistent
with the plaintiff’s gender identity and which is common among
health and other professionals who work with transgender
clients.”). For courts that do not pay such deference, or for courts
that have not yet confronted the issue, this Note serves to educate
and notify judges of potential risks should they refuse to follow
this majority approach.
23. Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 n.1 (E.D. Wisc. 2010).
24. Kosilek v. Mahoney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 n.1 (D. Mass. 2002);
see also Gammett v. Idaho State Bd. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV05-257-

S-MHW, 2007 WL2186896, at *1 n.1 (D. Idaho July 27, 2007)
(“Plaintiff was granted a legal name change after filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff is now known as Jenniffer Ann Spencer. Plaintiff’s
counsel used the feminine pronoun throughout court documents,
and [d]efendant’s counsel used the male pronoun. The [c]ourt
. . . has elected to use the male pronoun for ease of discussion.”).
25. Jorge Rivas, Court Blasts Judge Who Compared Transgender Immigrant to Pee-wee Herman, FUSION (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:49 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/193788/circuit-court-blasts-immigrationjudge-transgender. Luckily, the Ninth Circuit overruled a series of
this immigration-law judge’s rulings that blankly rejected transgender persons’ asylum claims. See Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch,
800 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he BIA erred, however, in
denying her application for [asylum] relief, ironically exhibiting
some of the same misconceptions about the transgender community that Avendano-Hernandez faced in her home country.”). This
Note recognizes that immigration-law judges may not fall under
the purview of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. For the purposes of this Note, assume that the judge’s discriminatory statement could have been uttered by any judge (elected or appointed,
state or federal, etc.) for which the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
could apply. For a comparison of immigration-law judges to judges
in state and federal court, see Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and
Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 428–430 (2011)
(arguing that immigration-law judges, because they are appointed
by the U.S. Department of Justice, lack true independence and a
conscious motive to maintain impartiality).
26. Nancy L. Sholes, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 379, 381–85 (1992).
27. LaDonna Childress, To Fulfill a Promise: Using Canons 3B(5) and
3B(6) of the Judicial Code of Conduct to Combat Sexual Orientation
Bias Against Gay and Lesbian Criminal Defendants, 34 SW. U. L. REV.
607, 614 (2005) (citing Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform
from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as a Substitute for Heightened
Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363, 375–76 (2000)).
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APPLICATION OF THE ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT

In 1924, the ABA promulgated its first formal Canon of Judicial Ethics (“Canons”), couched in lofty, aspirational goals for
the judiciary.26 In 1972, the ABA adopted a more practical
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC), which replaced the
Canons with better-articulated “Rules” of judicial conduct
under broader canons of aspirational ethics.27 The MCJC went
through a series of amendments in the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s, and it now contains a comprehensive set of provisions

“to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and personal conduct . . . .”28 Should
a judge refuse to accept a transgender individual’s gender-pronoun preference, that judge may be in violation of the MCJC.
This part discusses and applies relevant MCJC Canons to the
typical “preferred gender pronoun” situation described above.
A. MCJC Canons 1 & 2: Integrity, Impartiality, and the Manifestation of Bias
In its broadest sense, the MCJC requires a judge to “uphold
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary . . . .”29 Implicit in the definition of “integrity” is the
concept of respect—for the law, the parties, the lawyers, the
juries, and, most broadly, the public. How can a judge be viewed
as exhibiting respect when that same judge ignores an individual’s chosen identity by refusing to adopt an individual’s preferred gender pronouns, either in the courtroom or in a judicial
opinion? By failing to defer to an individual’s preferred mode of
reference, this lack of respect directly aggravates a chief medical
concern of the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health—“to reduce the distress of gender dysphoria.”30 Gender
dysphoria is an “internationally recognized treatment protocol”
that focuses on “affirming people in their true sex—their gender
identity—socially, medically, and legally” and is not subject to
voluntary control.31 Accordingly, the refusal to affirm an individual’s chosen identity carries with it the risk of serious psychological trauma by failing to validate transgender individuals
and their identities on a humanistic level.32 Moreover, MCJC
Rule 2.8 requires an air of courtesy from judges when dealing
with those in court: “A judge shall be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, [and] lawyers. . . .”33
Thus, the express requirement of courtesy further (and more
explicitly) mandates a judge’s respect for litigants, which
includes respect for an individual’s gender identity and preferred
mode of self-expression. Judges should be cognizant of this risk
when addressing transgender individuals in court.
The ignorance of a transgender individual’s proper, medically endorsed treatment further contributes to the very real

problem of microaggressions, or
In fact, the
“subtle forms of [intentional or
[Model Code]
unintentional] discrimination
that occur daily and can manifest contains express
as behavioral, verbal, or environprovisions
mental slights.”34 A common
against this
example in the LGBT context,
cited in Galupo’s study, is the manifestation of
“use of incorrectly gendered terbias in judicial
minology,”35 including the disregard of a transgender person’s proceedings . . . .
preferred gender pronouns.36
These aggressions often compound with one another and work
to “erode a[n individual’s] feeling of value.”37 Judges should
recognize this risk of psychological harm and interference with
legitimate methods of treatment and strive to avoid the manifestation of bias, whether conscious or not, by refusing to defer
to an individual’s own preferred gender pronouns. Accordingly,
to combat implicit biases, judges must first recognize that such
biases exist.38 Thereafter, they must “[r]outinely check
thought processes and decisions for possible bias” and “possess[] a certain degree of self-awareness” to prevent its manifestation through their conduct in court.39
In fact, the MCJC contains express provisions against this
manifestation of bias in judicial proceedings, also expressly
outlined in the definition of “impartiality.”40 The ABA defines
the term “impartiality” broadly to mean the “absence of bias or
prejudice,”41 and MCJC Rule 2.3 contains the following prohibitive provision:
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
or engage in harassment, including but not limited to
bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex,
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status,
or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff,
court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction
and control to do so.42

28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
29. Id. Canon 1.
30. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 167 (Coleman et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012),
http://www.wpath.org/uploaded_files/140/files/IJT%20SOC,%20V
7.pdf.
31. M. Dru Levasseur, Esq., Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the
Law to Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights,
39 VT. L. REV. 943, 956 (2015) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
32. Id. at 963.
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
(emphasis added).
34. M. Paz Galupo et al., Transgender Microaggressions in the Context of
Friendship: Patterns of Experience Across Friends’ Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity, 1 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER
DIVERSITY 461, 461 (2014).
35. Id. at 465 tbl.3.
36. Id.

37. Astead W. Herndon, Harvard Allows Students to Pick New Gender
Pronouns, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.boston
globe.com/metro/2015/09/02/harvard-allows-students-pick-newgender-pronouns/C0EXpZHw09zwCzo4hVhjdJ/story.html (quoting Genny Beemyn, director of the Stonewall Center—“a resource
center for LGBTQ and allied communities at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst”).
38. NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 5 (2012),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/
media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB
_Strategies_033012.ashx.
39. Id. at 10.
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see
id. TERMINOLOGY (defining “impartiality”).
41. Id. TERMINOLOGY.
42. Id. R. 2.3(B). Section (C) of Rule 2.3 also requires judges to
ensure that lawyers presenting in front of the tribunal “refrain
from manifesting bias or prejudice” on the basis of sex, gender, or
sexual orientation. Id. R. 2.3(C). This proscription carries with it
the additional responsibility on judges to ensure that lawyers,
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In this regard, manifestations
of bias are grounds for discipline.
Arguably, these include subtle
microaggressions such as the
refusal to defer to a party’s preferred gender pronouns as a form
of self-affirming identification.
Yet, prominent legal ethics commentator Bruce A. Green argues
that the “bias” the MCJC seeks to
curtail is not the sort-of implicit
bias—that is, “unconscious, nondeliberate attitudes . . . that
affect individuals’ decisions”—at
issue, here.43 This Note argues a
different interpretation: the
MCJC requires a broader showing
of respect, not just impartiality, by requiring judges to be selfaware of the effects of their conduct. This heightened selfawareness, coupled with the court’s responsibility to promote
justice,44 supports the contention that microaggressions and
implicit biases should be actively avoided, even when not
apparent on the face of a judge’s conduct.45 Even so, a judge’s
refusal to defer to a transgender individual’s preferred gender
pronouns might not be a reflection of implicit bias at all;
absent explanation, it could draw an inference of overt discrimination, or, if a judge does provide an explanation, such
rationale could be a mere guise—i.e., a mere pretext—for a discriminatory animus against identifying individuals. These
“active” forms of discrimination are most certainly grounds for
discipline under the MCJC.46

Finally, as Martha Minnow argues, each person—especially
those in the legal profession— maintains a special responsibility
to create “cultures, institutions, and resources to help individuals
empathize with those who are oppressed.”47 LGBT individuals,
including transgender persons, are part of a traditionally marginalized group, and judges are in a unique position of power in our
legal system, charged with promoting and ensuring justice.48
Accordingly, it is a judge’s affirmative role to create this culture of
upstanding citizenship in the interests of justice, which includes
empathy for minority communities. It is arguably unjust for a
judge, in the course of a judicial proceeding, to disregard a transgender individual’s preferred choice of pronoun, especially when
such disregard knowingly (and deleteriously) interferes with
treatment techniques for gender dysphoria normally left to the
sound discretion of medical professionals. Doing so only
strengthens the stigma associated with transgender persons and
undercuts their positive inclusion in modern society.

through their written or verbal conduct, do not contribute to the
deleterious effects of bias arising out of lawyers’ refusal to defer to
a transgender individual’s preferred gender pronouns. See id.
Accordingly, judges have the affirmative responsibility to prevent
the risk of discriminatory bias from all persons in the courtroom
from the very outset of litigation.
43. Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Injustice: The Urge to
Call “Bias,” 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 180 (2015) (referencing
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006)); id. at
183–85.
44. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
(“[T]he judiciary plays a central role in the preserving the principles of justice.”).
45. Note, too, that Rule 2.3 does not include a “knowledge” requirement. Id. R. 2.3. Thus, judges should not be willfully ignorant of
bias—implicit or explicit—and should take proactive steps to mitigate any such bias before it manifests in court.
46. See id.
47. Martha Minnow, Upstanders, Whistle-Blowers, and Rescuers, 2014
KONINGSBERGER LECTURE 1, 31 (2014). Upstanders, as opposed to
bystanders, are those who do not idly wait to see social change and
progress; instead, they are those who “speak out and act against
what is wrong.” Id. at 1.
48. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
49. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2A (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990).
Although the word “respect” was deleted in later versions of the
MCJC, the drafters made clear that the term is implicit within

MCJC Canon 2. In fact, the remnants of the “respect” language
are found in Rule 2.2, wherein “[a] judge shall uphold and apply
the law.” ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 8 (2007) (“The reference to a judge’s duty
to ‘respect’ the law was deleted because it was . . . unnecessary.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011). Even so, the original language is still maintained in
numerous state and federal codifications of the MCJC, so respect
for the law, in its broadest sense, is most applicable to the practical judicial profession. See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
1.1 (2016) (“Judges shall respect and comply with the law.”); N.C.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (2006) (amended 2015) (“A
judge should respect and comply with the law . . . .”); U.S.
COURTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15 cmt. (2014) (“Respect
for Law. A Judge should respect and comply with the law.
. . .”); 22 NYCCR 100.2(A) (2006) (“A judge shall respect and
comply with the law . . . .”).
50. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2. The MCJC defines
“impropriety” as “conduct that violates the law, court rules, or
provisions of th[e MCJC], and conduct that undermines a judge’s
independence, integrity, or impartiality.” Id. Terminology.
51. N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
ON THE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2016); N.Y.C. Admin. Code §8-102(23), at
3 (Dec. 21, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y.C. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE], http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications/
GenderID_InterpretiveGuide_2015.pdf.
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B. “Respect for the Law”
In earlier versions, the MCJC specifically held that a judge
must “respect and comply with the law.”49 Thus, to duly respect
the law, judges should be mindful of the current legal landscape
regarding transgender issues. The broadly couched term
requires a cognizance of the law and posits an affirmative duty
to avoid violating the law to “avoid the appearance of impropriety.”50 For example, the New York City Commission on Human
Rights (“Commission”) promulgated legal guidance in response
to its Human Rights Law, which protects against discrimination
on the basis of gender identity, gender expression, and transgender status.51 Under this local legislative scheme, transgender
individuals are protected from discrimination in the areas of

employment, public accommodation, and housing, and those
found in violation are potentially liable for up to $250,000 in
civil fines for conduct that is willful, wanton, or malicious.52 In
its guidance, the Commission provides articulated examples of
violations of the law, including “failing to use an individual’s preferred name or pronoun,” since “all people . . . have the right
to use their preferred name.”53 Courts in New York City—as
places of public accommodation54—must be aware of this guidance and must take precaution to avoid potential violations.
Again, failing to do so expressly violates the MCJC, since avoiding the “appearance of impropriety” carries with it the duty to
avoid violating the law.55
Certainly, the obvious response is that judges, themselves,
are granted absolute judicial immunity and cannot be held
liable for damages under comparable local statutes.56 In the
landmark decision of Stump v. Sparkman, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that judges maintain absolute immunity from
actions for damages taken in their official capacity, even when
judges’ acts are done maliciously or corruptly.57 However, the
Court in Pulliam clarified this holding: while absolute judicial
immunity still bars a claim for monetary relief, it does not pre-

clude a claim for injunctive
[S]eeking
relief, provided the claimant
continues to suffer real harm.58 injunctive relief to
Since then, at least one circuit
demand the use
court has made available of a transgender
prospective injunctive relief
against courts in other contexts litigant’s preferred
of discrimination.59 In fact, gender pronouns
seeking injunctive relief to
is expressly
demand the use of a transgenendorsed and
der litigant’s preferred gender
encouraged by
pronouns is expressly endorsed
and encouraged by Lambda
Lambda Legal.
Legal.60 As such, provided a
transgender litigant can show a continued harm that can only
be remedied by a prospective injunction, that litigant may be
able to successfully seek judicial relief.61
Finally, judicial ethics go beyond these legalistic arguments and
reach issues of fundamental morality and integrity. As the MCJC
Preamble points out, the MCJC “is not intended as an exhaustive
guide for the conduct of judges . . . who are governed in their

52. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102, 107(23) (West 2016); see also Kelsey
Harkness, In New York, You Could Be Fined $250K for Failing to Use
a Transgender Person’s ‘Preferred’ Pronoun, DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 6,
2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/01/06/in-new-york-you-couldbe-fined-250k-for-failing-to-use-a-transgender-persons-preferredpronoun/. The New York City Administrative Code also provides
for injunctive relief. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-402 (West 2016).
53. N.Y.C. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 54.
Specifically, the Commission provides the following examples of
conduct that give rise to municipal violations:

1915, 1995 WL 610355 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995) (same).
55. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
Notwithstanding an underlying violation of substantive law, the
“appearance of impropriety” also reaches conduct in reasonable
violation of the MCJC, not just state or federal law. Id. Thus, conduct that gives rise to prejudicial bias or the inference of discrimination should be avoided, as MCJC Rule 2.3 expressly prohibits
discriminatory conduct. Id.r. 2.3(A)–(B). Moreover, judges who
fail to act courteously or who lack integrity are also arguably subject to disciplinary action. See supra Part II.A.; MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8 AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
56. For a comprehensive discussion of judicial immunity, see SHRIVER
CENTER, FED. PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 8.2.A.1
(2013), http://federalpracticemanual.org/book/export/html/46.
57. Stump v. Sparkman, 435. U.S. 349, 356–57, 59 (1978).
58. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief
in a § 1983 civil-rights action).
59. Livingston, 68 F.3d 460 (holding in an Americans with Disabilities
Act action that, in light of Pulliam, the litigant was not foreclosed
from bringing a claim for injunctive relief against a state court
judge).
60. On its “Know Your Rights in Court” webpage, Lambda Legal provides a sample filing to the court, similar to a motion presented in
Manning. Know Your Rights in Court, supra note 21. The sample
motion expressly states that: (1) county courts are places of public accommodation; and (2) county legislation expressly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender identity in any place of public accommodation, including any county “facility, service[,] or
program.” LAMBDA LEGAL, SAMPLE MOTION 1–2 (July 30, 2008),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/sample_
motion.pdf.
61. A similar argument citing judicial immunity was brought to the
Maryland Office of the Attorney General (OAG) by a member of
the Maryland House of Delegates. Letter from Md. Assistant Att’y
Gen. Kathryn M. Rowe to Md. Delegate Virginia P. Clagett (Mar. 5,
2004), https://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/Advice2004/Clagett
Mar12.pdf.

1. Intentional or repeated refusal to use an individual’s preferred name, pronoun[,] or title. For
example, repeated calling a transgender woman
“him” or “Mr.” after she has made clear which
pronouns and title she uses.
2. Refusal to use an individual’s preferred name, pronoun, or title because they do not conform to gender stereotypes. For example, calling a woman
“Mr.” because her appearance is aligned with traditional gender-based stereotypes of masculinity.
Id.; Harkness, supra note 52.
54. The New York City Administrative Code defines a “place of public accommodation” as “providers, whether licensed or unlicensed, or goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages,
or privileges of any kind, and places, whether licensed or unlicensed, where goods, services, facilities, services, accommodations, advantages, or privileges or any kind are extended, offered,
sold, or otherwise made available.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 807(9)
(West 2016). In holding out services to all members of the public, as courts are required to do, courthouses and courtrooms
arguably constitute “places of public accommodation” under the
law. In other contexts of discrimination legislation, courts have
generally held that courthouses are subject to such statutes. See,
e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that courthouses are “public accommodations” subject to
the American with Disabilities Act); Livingston v. Guice, No. 94-
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judicial and personal conduct by
ethical
standards.
general
. . .”62 Moreover, “judges should
strive to exceed the standards of
conduct established by the
[MCJC],” especially since the “the
judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice” in
the U.S. legal system.63 As discussed above, a judge maintains
the ethical responsibility to protect
the dignity and integrity of the
courts, which hinges on the concept of respect. Thus, self-directing
judicial standards should maintain
a higher level of morality, even
beyond the confines of the law,
since judges are perceived as role
models to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.64

Rather than
forcing judges to
address the issue
of transgender
individuals’
preferred gender
pronouns . . . as
in Manning,
judges should be
more proactive in
combatting issues
of transgender
discrimination.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Rather than forcing judges to address the issue of transgender individuals’ preferred gender pronouns via formal
court motions as in Manning,65 judges should be more proactive in combatting issues of transgender discrimination. Just
as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
direct lawyers to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice,”66 and just as many state bars mandate a certain
allotment of hours dedicated to continuing legal education,67
so, too, should judges remain updated with the changing legal
landscape and corresponding ethical considerations. Judges
can borrow successful efforts of various corporate organizations and educational institutions, both of which routinely
engage in LGBT “sensitivity” training for their bodies. For
example, prominent business advisory firm EY (formerly
Ernst & Young) encourages LGBT inclusion in a “cultural
competency” program, educating its employees and clients on
the benefits and necessity of fostering an inclusive environment.68 Additionally, various educational institutions offer

62. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
63. Id. Scope.
64. Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000)
(arguing that diverse judges are both role models and figures of
public confidence but should be seen as “something more”—as
achieving cultural plurality on the bench).
65. Name Change Recognition Motion, United States v. Manning, No.
ARMY 20130739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011).
67. MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.ameri
canbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited Dec.
11, 2017) (providing a list of CLE requirements by state, many of
which require one or more hours of legal ethics education).
68. EY (formerly Ernst & Young), LEADING THROUGH INCLUSION: LGBT
INCLUSION IN THE WORKFORCE (2012). A description of EY’s LGBTinclusion program is on its website at http://www.ey.com/
us/en/about-us/our-people-and-culture/diversity-and-inclusive-
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“Ally” training for their student and professional populations
in order to help “participants grow in their personal awareness, knowledge, skills, and ability to act as social justice
allies.”69 Finally, LGBT advocacy groups across the country
offer public materials to organizations to help these organizations conduct their own inclusivity training for their members.70 In fact, consistent with the position of this Note,
Lambda Legal offers a “Fair Courts Toolkit for Everyday
Advocates,” which provides guidance to judges and court
staffers as to how to best respect LGBT individuals in a court
environment.71 Education is key.
In addition, to avoid potential conflict at a later stage in litigation, to avoid a potential violation of the MCJC, and to
avoid potential trauma to transgender individuals, judges
should encourage determinations of this preferred-gender-pronoun issue up front. Thus, courts should consider incorporating transgender sensitivity guidelines into their local rules. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania prescribes detailed requirements regarding what
is to be specifically discussed during pretrial conferences
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.72 Pursuant to these
local rules, parties must answer inquiries related to the underlying litigation, including issues of electronic discovery, use of
proposed search terms, anticipated dispositive motions to be
filed, proposals for alternative dispute resolution procedures,
and other inquiries and deadlines.73 Correspondingly, judges,
as managers of these conferences, should encourage full and
frank discussions of the potential ethical issues surrounding
transgender litigants from the outset of litigation, including, if
applicable, a specific inquiry regarding the use of a transgender
individual’s preferred gender pronouns. Doing so would avoid
potential trauma down the line for transgender litigants and
expedite litigation by anticipating and resolving likely court
motions before they have even been filed. Courts can adequately incorporate this solution in their local rules by adding
the following point for discussion to their pretrial conference
agenda: “Identify and establish preferred names (including, if
applicable, preferred pronouns) for all parties subject to the litigation.” The proposed directive would maintain consistency

ness/better-together (last visited February 5, 2018).
69. Allyhood Development Training, U. MICH. SPECTRUM CTR.,
https://spectrumcenter.umich.edu/article/allyhood-developmenttraining (last visited May 14, 2016); LGBT Ally Network, U. ILL.
OFF. INCLUSION & INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS, https://oiir.illi
nois.edu/lgbt-resource-center/our-programs/lgbt-ally-network
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
70. Diversity Training on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/diversity-training-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-issues (last visited
May 14, 2016).
71. LAMBDA LEGAL, GEAR UP! A FAIR COURTS TOOLKIT FOR EVERYDAY
ADVOCATES (2009), http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/down
loads/gu_gear-up.zip. The toolkit expressly includes guidance on
deferring to and affirming a transgender individual’s self-identity
and use of preferred gender pronouns. Id.
72. W.D. PA. LOCAL CIV. R. (LCvR) 16.1.
73. Id. app. LCvR 16.1A.

across legal documents and would apply to all litigants—transgender or not. More simply, courts can implement a “checkthe-box” system upon initial electronic filings that instructs
lawyers to specify a party’s pronoun and salutation preference
to guide judges and other court staffers from the outset of litigation.
Even if not formally incorporated in a court’s local rules,
state or federal authorities can and should provide official
guidance to help judges and courts foster a more inclusive
environment. For example, the New York state judicial system
already maintains a quick-reference manual to help judges adequately respond to transgender issues.74 Included in this document is specific guidance addressing transgender pronoun
use: “Transgender people frequently choose to use a name that
affirms their gender identity, even if it is not what is on legal
documents. . . . Judges should make every effort to use pronouns and salutations that affirm a party’s gender identity.”75
Other courts should follow suit. Since judges have an affirmative duty to protect litigants from lawyers who exhibit bias and
prejudice against others on the basis of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation,76 these problems must be addressed as early as
possible. Judges should be mindful of this duty and take active
steps to avoid a breach of this duty.
Finally, the MCJC could be changed to include an express
provision and an associated comment to curtail this problem.
First, drafters could amend MCJC Rule 2.3 to expressly include
“gender identity” in its list of prohibited bases for bias and prejudice. Although implicit in discrimination on the basis of “sex”
and “gender,” an express provision regarding gender identity
would better guide judges in understanding the repercussions
of their actions in court proceedings by explicitly flagging the
issue.77 Also, the ABA could provide more detailed guidance in
its comments to Rule 2.3. Currently, Comment 2 provides
examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice: “epithets; slurs;
demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or
nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal
characteristics.”78 Even though the comment makes clear that
these manifestations “include, but are not limited to” those outlined in the non-exhaustive list, more explicit guidance can better flag transgender issues and prevent bias from ever entering
into the courtroom in the first place.79 Thus, a proposed revision to Comment 2 could include “failing or refusing to adopt
a transgender person’s preferred pronoun” to help curtail this
risk of potential trauma. Doing so would put judges on better
notice of this problem within the judicial system.

74. SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, TRANSGENDER 101: TERMS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFICERS OF THE COURT (2011), https://www.ny
courts.gov/ip/judicialinstitute/transgender/220B.pdf.
75. Id. at 1.
76. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
77. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3. Some state codifications
of the MCJC expressly include “gender identity” on the list of protected classes under Rule 2.3. ABA POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM.,
COMPARISON OF ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT AND STATE
VARIATIONS 3–4 (Dec. 11 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/

CONCLUSION

Judges serve as pillars of the U.S. system of justice. Their
unique position of power carries with it the responsibility to
promote courtesy, impartiality, dignity, integrity, and respect.
The MCJC guides the ethical conduct of judges to protect their
status and preserve this notion of justice. In the case of Chelsea
Manning, the ACCA undoubtedly reached the correct decision
in forcing all parties to utilize Manning’s preferred gender pronouns as per her identification as female. However, judges
should not be forced to reach the issue only when brought by
a party seeking protection; they should proactively seek to protect transgender individuals and their identities from the outset of litigation. Doing so is not only consistent with the
MCJC, but also with the current legal landscape of transgender
rights in the United States. To promulgate this change, judges
do not need to pen a landmark decision for the court. Instead,
it starts with education. It starts with respect.
It starts with a pronoun.

Francesco G. Salpietro is a corporate and securities associate at Dechert LLP in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. He is a magna cum laude graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law, where he served as the Lead Executive Editor of the University of Pittsburgh Law
Review. He received a Bachelor of Music Arts
degree in opera performance from the University of Michigan School of Music, Theatre & Dance. Mr. Salpietro
maintains an active pro bono practice with a focus on representing
LGBT individuals.

content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
2_3.authcheckdam.pdf. These states include Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Oregon. Id.
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79. Id.
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The Impact of the Gerhardt Decision
on Marijuana Driving Cases
Mary A. Celeste

O

ne of the major consequences of legalizing marijuana
is that it can affect drivers on the roadways. Courts
across the country are facing issues such as the applicability of the long established standard field sobriety test for
alcohol-driving impairment to determine marijuana-driving
impairment; the characteristics indicative of marijuana-driving
impairment; and the blood nanogram concentration levels that
establish marijuana-driving impairment. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court was the first state Supreme Court out of the
box to address these issues.
On January 6, 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in the case of Commonwealth v. Gerhardt1, which required the court to consider several novel
questions:
• What physical characteristics (e.g., bloodshot eyes, dilated
pupils, lack of coordination, slow balance or reaction times,
garbled or slow speech) permit an inference of impaired
driving by reason of marijuana use?
• Is there a scientifically established correlation between performances on field sobriety tests and marijuana-impaired
driving?

• Is there a level of intoxication that is generally accepted as
establishing impairment as to driving?
• Has any jurisdiction, foreign or domestic, recognized such
a level of intoxication?2
As far as marijuana-driving cases go, the facts of the Gerhardt
case were not unusual. The defendant (Gerhardt) was stopped
for driving without working tail lights. Once stopped, an officer
saw smoke inside the vehicle and detected the odor of marijuana. The defendant stated that he had smoked around three
hours before the stop, although another passenger said it had
only been 20 minutes. Gerhardt pulled two marijuana cigarettes
(“roaches”) from an ashtray and handed them to the officer. In
a subsequent search, officers found two more roaches.3
As more and more marijuana-driving cases come forward,
the plain view doctrine will play a large role. The plain-view
doctrine has been expanded to include plain feel, plain smell,
and plain hearing.4 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees that the
smell of marijuana may provide probable cause to obtain a
search warrant.5 Further, some state courts hold that detection
of the odor of marijuana or marijuana smoke provides probable cause for a warrantless search.6 Oddly enough, searches
based upon marijuana smell have decreased in the states of

Footnotes
1. Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 81 N.E.3d 751
(2017); Public Case Information, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AND
APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, http://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/display_docket.php?dno=SJC-11967 (last updated
Oct. 18, 2017).
2. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 774–88; Martha Bebinger, Mass. High Court
Tackles Driving Under the Influence of Marijuana, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/all-thingsconsidered/2017/01/06/supreme-judicial-court-marijuana-driving.
3. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 778–79.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973)
(recognizing a “plain hear” exception, the Court held there was
no search where officers overheard conversation in adjoining
hotel room); United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.1992)
(holding that an officer smelling marijuana in defendant’s car was
not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
5. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed.
2d 495 (2013).
6. See, e.g., State v. Sarto, 195 N.J. Super. 565, 574, 481 A.2d 281
(App. Div. 1984) (reversing the order of suppression because “the
strong odor of unburned marijuana gave police probable cause to
search the trunk for evidence of contraband”); Waugh v. State, 20
Md. App. 682, 691, 318 A.2d 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (stating that “[t]rained investigators are entitled to rely upon the sense
of smell to establish probable cause, just as surely as they are entitled to rely upon the senses of sight, hearing, touch or taste”),
rev’d on other grounds, 275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1975); see also
Andrea Ben-Yosef, Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Search of

Motor Vehicle Based on Odor of Marijuana—State Cases, 114 A.L.R.
5th 173 (2003); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 72 (1993);
Odor of Narcotics as Providing Probable Cause for Warrantless
Search, 5 A.L.R. 4th 681 (1981). In Virginia, the Court of Appeals
has hinted at an acceptance of plain smell, but has never clearly
adopted the doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 0857-973, 1997 WL 557005, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1997) (appearing
to find probable cause based on odor alone, but not clearly
excluding other factors from the holding); Lewis v. Commonwealth, No. 1483-96-1, 1997 WL 260581, at *1–2 (Va. Ct. App.
May 20, 1997) (suggesting, but not expressly stating, that the
odor of marijuana alone gave officer probable cause to search
vehicle). The situation in Georgia is substantially similar to that
in Virginia. Compare Brewer v. State, 199 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1973) (stating that odor of marijuana is not in itself sufficient evidence to establish probable cause), overruled by State v.
Folk, 521 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), and Albert v. State,
511 S.E.2d 244, 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing that the
issue of plain smell was still unresolved in Georgia, and holding
that odor of marijuana was only one factor in the determination
of probable cause), with Rogers v. State, 205 S.E.2d 901, 903 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1974) (recanting prior statement from Brewer that odor
alone cannot establish probable cause), and Folk, 521 S.E.2d at
198 (“We now hold that a trained police officer’s perception of the
odor of burning marijuana . . . constitutes sufficient probable
cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle.”). Although
Folk appeared to settle the issue of plain smell in Georgia, it
remains to be seen whether the Georgia Supreme Court will ratify that decision if given the opportunity to rule on plain smell.
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Colorado and Washington, which were two of the first states
to legalize recreational marijuana.7
All of the facts related to the Gerhardt stop established probable cause to request that he perform a standard field sobriety
test and Gerhardt consented. He failed several tests:
Rather than standing heel to toe, with his right foot in
front and his left toes touching his heel, as he had been
shown, Gerhardt moved his feet so that they were side by
side; he also did not turn around as instructed . . . Gerhard[t] did not remain upright on one foot, instead
putting his foot down multiple times, and swayed.8
It should be noted that counting backwards and reciting the
alphabet, although frequently used by law enforcement in suspected driving-impairment stops, is not part of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration sanctioned alcohol field
sobriety tests.
For purposes of alcohol impairment, a standard field sobriety test consists of the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the one-leg
stand, and the walk-and-turn.9 For purposes of detecting drug
impairment, sometimes the Romberg or modified Romberg test
is added:
[T]he officer will ask you to stand with your feet
together, head tilted slightly back and eyes closed. You
will be asked to estimate when 30 seconds has passed, and
say “stop” when you think it’s been that long. While you
are balancing, the officer will look for six clues: amount

7. Sam Petulla & Jon Schuppe, Police Searches Drop Dramatically in
States that Legalized Marijuana, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2017),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/police-searches-dropdramatically-states-legalized-marijuana-n776146.
8. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 779.
9. A Resource Guide Describes the Science and the Law About Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, NHTSA (Sept. 1999), https://one.nhtsa.gov/
About-NHTSA/Traffic-Techs/current/ci.A-Resource-GuideDescribes-The-Science-And-The-Law-About-Horizontal-GazeNystagmus.print; DWI DETECTION AND STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
(March 2013), http://www.njsp.org/division/investigations/pdf/
adtu/20160105_paticipantmanual.pdf.
10. Romberg Balance Test, FIELDSOBRIETYTESTS.ORG, http://www.
fieldsobrietytests.org/rombergbalancetest.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2017).
11. Hartman et al., Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) Examination Characteristics of Cannabis Impairment, 92 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 219–29 (July 2016), https://shawglobalnews.files.
wordpress.com/2017/03/2016-hartman-dre-examinationcharacteristics-of-cannabis-impairment.pdf
12. Bosker et al., A Placebo-Controlled Study to Assess Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests Performance during Alcohol and Cannabis Intoxication in Heavy Cannabis Users and Accuracy of Point of Collection
Ttesting Devices for Detecting THC in Ooral Fluid, 223 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 439–46 (2012).
13. K. Papafotiou et. al., An Evaluation of the Sensitivity of the Standardised Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) to Detect Impairment due to
Marijuana Intoxication, 180 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 107–14 (2005);
Luke A. Downey et al., Detecting Impairment Associated with

and direction of swaying,
eyelid/body tremors, estimate of
when 30 seconds has passed, muscle tone, sounds or statements
made during the test, ability to follow directions.10

Some research
says that
standard field
sobriety tests
are effective
in identifying
marijuanadriving
impairment . . . .

Some research says that standard
field sobriety tests are effective in
identifying marijuana-driving impairment11, some research says that they
are only moderately successful12,
while other research says that only
the walk-and-turn or the one-leg stand tests are effective.13 One
study stated that the finger-to-nose test was the best test to accurately predict cannabis impairment.14 Many agree, however, that
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test is not effective.15
Indicators of marijuana-driving impairment include eyelid
tremors, increased pulse, elevated systolic blood pressure,
dilated pupil size, lane weaving, driving on the wrong side of the
road, drifting, following too close, driving a large distance from
the vehicle ahead, not responding to questions, reddened eyes,
slow pupil reaction, nervousness, laughing, and unusual facial
expressions.16 Some believe that one side effect includes “green
tongue,” although the appellate courts in both Utah and Washington are skeptical.17
Studies and reports from 2004 through 2012 designated
THC blood concentration levels from 2 to as high as 30 THC
ng/ml as establishing marijuana-driving impairment.18 The
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16.

17.

18.
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Data from the Drug Evaluation and Classification Program, 15
TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 125–31 (2014).
Hartman et al., supra note 11, at 223.
Id. at 226; see also Drug Categories, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.lapdonline.org/special_operations_support_
division/content_basic_view/1039 (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
Karl Citek, The Drug Evaluation Classification Program: Using
Ocular and Other Signs to Detect Drug Intoxication, 69 J. AMER.
OPTOMETRIC ASS’N 211, 213 (1998).
State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185, 190 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Wheeler, No. 24397–1–II, 2000 WL 646511, *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
May 19, 2000).
Drummer et al., The Involvement of Drugs in Drivers of Motor Vehicles Killed in Australian Road Traffic Crashes, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 239–48 (2004); J.G. Ramaekers et al., Cognition
and Motor Control as a Function of THC Concentration in Serum
and Oral Fluid: Limits of Impairment, 85 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 114-22 (2006); Franjo Grotenherman et al., Developing
Limits for Driving Under Cannabis, 102 ADDICTION 1910-17
(2007); Sewell et al., The Effect of Cannabis Compared to Alcohol
on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 185-93 (2009); W. M. Bosker et
al., A Placebo-Controlled Study to Assess Standardized Field Sobriety Tests Performance During Alcohol and Cannabis Intoxication in
Heavy Cannabis Users and Accuracy of Point of Collection Testing
Devices for Detecting THC in Oral Fluid, 223 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
439, 445 (2012).
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more recent studies and reports,
however, do not support the designation of a blood nanogram
concentration level as the sole
indicator of marijuana-driving
impairment. The July 2017
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration Marijuana-Impaired Driving Report to Congress stated that there is a “poor
correlation of THC concentrations in the blood with impairment” and that “setting per se
levels is not meaningful.”19 In
2016 the AAA Traffic Safety
Administration also stated that
“it is difficult to establish a relationship between a person’s THC
blood or plasma concentration
and performance impairing
effects. Concentrations of parent
drug and metabolite are very dependent on pattern of use as
well as dose. . . . It is inadvisable to try and predict effects
based on blood THC concentration alone.”20 Also in 2016, the
AAA Traffic Safety Research Foundation conducted a study
and concluded that “quantitative threshold for per se laws for
THC following cannabis use cannot be scientifically supported.”21
There are pending federal studies related to marijuana and
driving. The National Institute on Drug Abuse is using a $1.4
million grant to conduct a five-year study to determine how
marijuana impacts critical brain functions for driving.22 The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is conducting
a second research project to take initial steps towards developing a battery of tests to identify drivers who have recently used
marijuana.23 The State of Colorado granted the University of
Colorado $1.68 million to look at the impacts of marijuana use
on driving.24
In the midst of all of this attention on marijuana and driving, the long-awaited Gerhardt decision was handed down in
September 2017. The applicability of standard field sobriety
tests to marijuana-driving impairment presented a few important legal issues for the Massachusetts Supreme Court. One

issue was that standard field sobriety tests were established to
detect alcohol driving impairment—not marijuana or drugdriving impairment. Additionally, as the court noted, there are
conflicting studies on the topic and no consensus in the scientific community to support their applicability to marijuanadriving impairment.
Regardless, the Gerhardt court stated that “[t]he absence of
scientific consensus regarding the use of standard [field sobriety tests] in attempting to evaluate marijuana intoxication
does not mean that they have no probative value.”25 As such,
the court concluded that, although a police officer may testify
about their observations related to standard field sobriety tests:

19. R. COMPTON, MARIJUANA-IMPAIRED DRIVING—A REPORT TO CONGRESS, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT
HS 812 440, iii (July 2017).
20. DRUGS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACT SHEETS, NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT HS 809 725, 8–9 (April
2004); see also AMY BERNING & DEREECE D. SMITHERS, UNDERSTANDING THE LIMITATIONS OF DRUG TEST INFORMATION, REPORTING,
AND TESTING PRACTICES IN FATAL CRASHES, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT HS 812 072 (November 2014).
21. BARRY LOGAN ET AL., AAA FOUNDATION FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, AN
EVALUATION OF DATA FROM DRIVERS ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE IN RELATION TO PER SE LIMITS FOR CANNABIS 3 (2016).
22. Gregory B. Hladky, Hartford Hospital Researches Studying Pot
Smoking and Driving, HARTFORD COURANT (April 30, 2017),

http://www.courant.com/health/hc-marijuana-studies-hartfordhospital-20170403-story.html.
ADVANCED ROADSIDE IMPAIRED DRIVING ENFORCEMENT, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 8 (2007),
https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oag/publication/
attachments/2007%20NHTSA%20ARIDE%20Manual.pdf.
John Ingold, Colorado Researchers Receive $2.35M to Study Marijuana Use in Driving, Other Impacts of Legalization, DENVER POST
(December 13, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/12/13/
colorado-researchers-grant-marijuana-driving-legalizationimpacts/.
Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 782.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
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A police officer may not suggest, however, on direct
examination that an individual’s performance on a[]
[standard field sobriety test] established that the individual was under the influence of marijuana. Likewise, an
officer may not testify that a defendant “passed” or
“failed” any [standard field sobriety test], as this language
improperly implies that the [standard field sobriety test]
is a definitive test of marijuana use or impairment.26
The court went even further and concluded that:
The fact that the [standard field sobriety tests] cannot
be treated as scientific “tests” of impairment means that
evidence of performance on [standard field sobriety
tests], alone, is not sufficient to support a finding that a
defendant’s ability to drive safely was impaired due to the
consumption of marijuana, and the jury must be so
instructed.27
What other factors should be considered in determining
driving impairment? Perhaps toxicology reports indicating
THC blood nanogram concentration levels; the degree of bad
driving; physical evidence, such as marijuana paraphernalia or
cigarettes in plain view; inculpatory statements, such as “I just
smoked some marijuana”; an odor of marijuana; observations
by law enforcement of characteristics like bloodshot eyes; and
others as identified by the Gerhardt Court. Toxicology reports
offering THC blood concentration levels are themselves under
scrutiny. As noted above in the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s report to Congress, setting per se levels is not

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.

meaningful,28 and last year’s AAA Traffic Safety Research Foundation study concluded that “quantitative threshold for per se
laws for THC following cannabis use cannot be scientifically
supported.”29 If the toxicological findings also become an
issue, then Massachusetts may only be left with the drug recognition expert observations as identified and supported by the
ruling: bad driving, physical evidence, odor, and inculpatory
statements.
This may cause the “road” to conviction in marijuana-driving cases to narrow in Massachusetts and perhaps in other
Daubert states. Massachusetts, federal courts, and over half of
the state courts in the U.S. use the Daubert standard for the
admissibility of scientific evidence.30 Does this mean that other
courts will adopt the Massachusetts analysis on the admissibility of standard field sobriety tests in marijuana-driving cases
even though the Massachusetts decision is not binding on
them? Is the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in Gerhardt
setting the stage for how courts should treat standard field
sobriety tests for marijuana-driving-impairment cases and
maybe even all drugged-driving cases?
What about other drugs and driving impairment? A recent
report authored by the Foundation for Advancing Alcohol
Responsibility and the Governors Highway Safety Association
found that 43% of drivers who died in a crash had used a legal
or illegal drug compared to 37% who tested above the illegal
per se limit for alcohol.31 While this information may be
indicative of an increase in drugged-driving fatalities as surpassing alcohol-driver fatalities, the report states that “[d]ata
on drug presence in crash-involved drivers are incomplete in
most jurisdictions, inconsistent from state to state, and some-

times inconsistent across jurisdictions within states.”32
Although the Foundation for Advancing Alcohol Responsibility has the best nationwide data on this matter, there are some
shortcomings in the data because it only tested 57% of drivers
involved in crashes.33 It is also important to note that driving
under the influence of drugs or drugs found at the time of an
autopsy is not necessarily equivalent to impaired driving.
All things considered, driving under the influence of marijuana in particular, and driving under the influence of drugs in
general, is an escalating problem for the roadways and the
courts. State trial and supreme courts will have to make important decisions about how to address the science establishing
impairment, the role of the drug recognition expert, and the
applicability of standard field sobriety tests in drugged-driving
cases. Will the Massachusetts findings regarding marijuana
and driving under a Daubert analysis influence how courts will
treat driving under the influence of other drugs as well? Slowly
the answers will come.

28. COMPTON, supra note 19, at iii.
29. BARRY LOGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
30. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24, 641 N.E.2d 1342,
1348 (1994); 50 State Survey of Daubert/Frye Applicability, ABA,
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/daubert-frye-survey.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2017);
Daubert Standard, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/

wex/daubert_standard (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
31. JAMES HEDLUND, DRUG-IMPAIRED DRIVING, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY
SAFETY ASSOCIATION & FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCING ALCOHOL
RESPONSIBILITY 7, 9 (2017).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 7.
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Asocial Media:
When Lawyers and Judges Must Disconnect
Kelly Lynn Anders

F

or many lawyers and judges, the use of social media can
pose as many risks as rewards. With electronic communication methods sometimes surpassing the use of more traditional methods, legal professionals have little choice but to
engage in some of the more popular social-media platforms,
such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter.
Certainly, countless other communication methods exist
and will continue to be developed; however, like the aforementioned trio, social media will likely always continue to
share several key traits, each of which will continue to pose
challenges for ethical communication among legal professionals. First, it is public—so public, in fact, that access spans the
globe. Second, it is immediate. When comments are posted,
they appear in “real time” and for all to see. Finally, it is permanent. Even after deleting comments, photos, and hyperlinks, there’s no guarantee that they will not be copied before
they have been deleted, thereby leading to the possibility (no
matter how slim) that anything posted online can take on a life
of its own.
Any one of these possibilities, viewed singularly, could create enough ethical minefields to make even the most seasoned
practitioners take pause. As a result, this uncertainty has
inspired myriad articles, seminars, and guides for “best practices” in maneuvering through the potential pitfalls involved in
social media where lawyers and judges are concerned.
Although the American Bar Association has published several
useful directives,1 clear guidelines have yet to be included in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) or the Model
Rules of Judicial Conduct (MRJC).
There are many valuable references that provide general
guidance on social-media usage for lawyers and judges,2 but
they fail to address yet another delicate component involved in
social-media ties—breaking them. Severing ties on social
media carries with it a variety of ethically sensitive considerations, ones that involve rules of professional conduct, professionalism, and a skill that is becoming ever more nuanced—
tact.
Several years ago, some states began to ban certain socialmedia connections between lawyers and judges, thereby
requiring them to retroactively sever ties.3 But no advice was
given as to how best to do so. This article will address the
mechanics of severing ties on three currently popular sites, the
professional implications of severing social-media connections, relevant rules governing judicial and attorney conduct,

and a discussion of “best practices” for lawyers and judges to
follow when social-media ties must be broken.

This article was adapted from Kelly Lynn Anders, Ethical Exits: When
Lawyers and Judges Must Disconnect on Social Media, 7 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 187 (2012-13).

2. One of the most comprehensive and current examples is JAN L.
JACOBOWITZ & JOHN G. BROWNING, LEGAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL
MEDIA: A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, Ch. 8 (2017). Another is
“Social Media and Judicial Ethics,” JUD. CONDUCT REP., Vol. 39,
No. 1 (Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., 2017).
3. Id. See also Samuel V. Jones, Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The
Ethics of Prohibition, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281 (2011).

Footnotes
1. See, e.g., ABA Formal Opinion 462, “Judges’ Use of Electronic
Social Networking Media” (Feb. 21, 2013).
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I.

THE MECHANICS OF SEVERING TIES ON FACEBOOK,
LINKEDIN, AND TWITTER

Developing contacts is much easier than ending them.
Mechanically, the processes for doing so on Facebook,
LinkedIn, and Twitter are simple. Ethically and professionally,
this task can be nuanced and complex.
A. UNFRIENDING AND UNLIKING ON FACEBOOK
There are two ways to sever ties on Facebook—via the
“unfriend” and “unlike” features. The former is associated with
disconnecting from a user’s personal page, while the latter provides a way to sever ties from pages associated with companies,
clubs, groups, organizations, and other business-related pages
that belong to individuals.
When one unfriends or unlikes, page owners are not notified; however, page owners and administrators are advised of
new friends and likes. Unfriending and unliking are most
noticeable on pages with the fewest friends and likes, or when
they involve users that page owners or administrators know
particularly well.
Although it is likely that fleeting friendships and affiliations
routinely come and go among more junior or casual users,
such as minors and college students, and they may have hundreds (and, sometimes, thousands) of friends and likes on
their pages, the same cannot commonly be assumed of lawyers
and judges. As a result, each disconnection could be much easier to detect, not only by page owners and administrators, but
also by other friends or visitors who might be monitoring
friends and likes on particular pages. In instances where connections involve lawyers and judges, it may be awkward to
unlike and unfriend, even when directed to do so.
B. UNLINKING ON LINKEDIN
In contrast to Facebook and Twitter, LinkedIn is almost
solely used for professional purposes, including networking,
establishing and broadening contacts, joining professional
groups, and even job searches and “following” companies to
keep track of their news. As a result, affiliations tend to be limited to users who are less interested in participating in some of
the more personal features found on Facebook (e.g., posting
photographs, announcing one’s immediate whereabouts, etc.),

and are instead more inclined to use the site to monitor career
transitions, read business-related news articles targeted to their
interests, recommend colleagues, and send emails. It should be
noted, however, that users may opt to link to their pages on
Facebook and Twitter so that posting a message on one platform will automatically ensure the identical posting on the
other.
Depending on the level of privacy selected on one’s profile,
it is possible for users who are linked to see others’ connections within their networks. In the most lax privacy option, a
user’s connections may be viewed by any LinkedIn user—both
inside and outside of the user’s immediate network. It cannot
be assumed that every lawyer and judge uses the most stringent privacy setting; even if some do, this does not erase the
possibility that others will gain access to lists of connections
that were intended to have limited access.
On LinkedIn, the unlinking process is as simple as clicking
a button. As with Facebook, there are no notifications sent
when links are broken.
C. UNFOLLOWING ON TWITTER
Just as Facebook has added new words to the popular cultural lexicon with “unliking” and “unfriending,” Twitter has
introduced the concept of “unfollowing,” which enables users
to cease receiving tweets from users they once “followed.” On
Twitter, a user’s followers remain public knowledge, particularly for accounts used for business or professional purposes.
Twitter assists users in locating companies, schools, organizations, and public figures to follow, based on perceived interests
that stem from tracking accounts followed by users and others
in their networks.
Lawyers and judges may have Twitter accounts that are used
for personal or professional purposes, and there are many articles and seminars that provide general guidance about the ethical considerations involved in doing so. The same is true for
law firms, which, in small numbers, also use Twitter for firm
marketing and informational purposes. It is uncertain whether
these resources provide instruction about the potential complications that may be involved in severing ties. Rather, they
appear to be focused more on their formation and maintenance.
Tweets are currently limited to 280 characters, but users
may send unlimited numbers of such updates on a daily basis.
A simple “unfollow” button is all that one needs to click to end
a connection. As with Facebook and LinkedIn, users are not
notified when this occurs.
II. SOCIAL-MEDIA DISCONNECTIONS AND THE MODEL
RULES

Because of the lack of notification when a user opts to end
a social-media connection, one could wrongly assume that severing ties would automatically be easier, less awkward, and
more socially graceful. On the contrary, this simple act can test
even the most experienced legal professional’s rudimentary
understanding of the concept of professionalism in the law.
Regardless of whether attorneys and judges are parting ways
through traditional or virtual channels, ethical expectations
are the same—or they should be. The following sections will
address relevant rules in the MRPC and MRJC that may
directly or indirectly relate to severing social-media ties.

A. EXITING SOCIAL MEDIA
Regardless of
AND THE MODEL RULES
whether attorneys
OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
are parting
As previously mentioned,
ways through
social media is not currently
traditional
included in the MRPC. However, it is surprising to note that
or virtual
the current rules do not include
channels, ethical
any language or guidance about
expectations
lawyers severing ties with
judges or other lawyers in any are the same—or
medium. Perhaps it’s thought
they should be.
that parting ways is merely a
part of general communications, such as “hello” and “goodbye”; it is more likely that such “goodbyes” were not previously envisioned. But times have changed, and social media is
no longer new. As a result, the absence of guidance in the
MRPC highlights a lack of clarity about modern expectations
of professional communication among legal professionals that
needs to be addressed and resolved.
The primary focus of communication in the MRPC, Rule
1.4, concerns a lawyer’s duties in reference to communications
with clients. Additional expectations concerning communicating with clients can be found in Rule 7.1; however, even in text
addressing client communications, very little, if any, guidance
exists to instruct lawyers on “best practices” or even basic
expectations for severing ties. With recent discussions in legal
education, media, and other sources about the lacking preparation of “practice-ready” lawyers, it cannot be assumed that
this skill has been mastered (or even addressed) simply
because one has successfully completed law study and has the
wherewithal to create a social-media presence.
Absent clear-cut guidance, general participation in social
media may, in part, be governed by Rules 3.5 (Impartiality and
Decorum of the Tribunal), 8.4(d) and (e) (Misconduct), and
the various rules concerning advertising, along with the aforementioned Rules 1.4 and 7.1. Yet another applicable section of
the MRPC is Rule 5.1, which addresses “Responsibilities of
Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers,” who are
charged with establishing guidelines for the professional performance of junior lawyers.
Additionally, there are some firms and managing partners
who may have established internal guidelines for attorneys to
follow when engaging in social-media activities. However,
absent guidelines from the MRPC, lawyers’ performance will
likely continue to lack consistency or uniformity, which can
cause confusion about expectations of best practices for
lawyers, judges, and others who are directly or indirectly
involved in the legal community, including clients, jurors, and
the general public.
B. EXITING SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE MODEL RULES
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Much like the lack of coverage in the MRPC, the MRJC neither specifically addresses social media, nor provides guidance
for severing ties with lawyers or other judges. Indirect guidance is contained in Canons 2 and 3, specifically in Rules 2.2
(Impartiality and Fairness), 2.4 (External Influences on JudiCourt Review - Volume 53 175

cial Conduct), and 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General).
Additional guidance for performance in this area is found in
Rules 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) and 1.3
(Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office).
Of the scant number of directives in the MRJC related to
communication, most are focused on the interests of parties
whose cases are being heard in court proceedings. Although
traditional methods of communication have logically and historically been left to judicial discretion—and, for the most
part, with great success—the public and uncontrollable
nature of social media calls for a different approach. Guidance
in entering into active participation in social-media communication, along with clearly defined rules for severing ties
with lawyers and others inside and outside of the legal community with whom judges may be linked, would provide
much-needed clarity about an increasingly important element
of what it means to serve as a judge in the new millennium—
and to do so in a way that deftly combines professionalism,
decorum, and accessibility.
III. RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES FOR LAWYERS
AND JUDGES WHO MUST SEVER TIES ON SOCIAL
MEDIA

Although Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter do not advise a
user of broken connections, a lawyer’s or judge’s basic understanding of professionalism in the law should dictate the
importance of disclosure. Regardless of who is breaking the
tie—the judge or the lawyer—one should notify the other of
the intention to do so, along with the rationale. For casual
acquaintances, an email would be sufficient. For more personal connections, which, for this purpose, are limited to the
small number of one’s closest colleagues, a brief telephone
call or in-person meeting to discuss the reason for the
impending disconnection would be preferable, provided adequate time exists to do so. However, considering the limited
amount of free time enjoyed by any legal professional, availability for personal advisories may be limited at best. An
email, though not preferred, would at least put close contacts
on notice of the need to sever ties so that they would know to
expect it, and an invitation to call or meet to discuss the matter could be included in the message.
Although it is unlikely that anyone would take offense to
severing ties due to a mandate, there are also instances where
lawyers and judges opt to do so voluntarily. Examples may
include breaking ties because of changes in employment, disassociations due to sanctions, or the ending of friendships. With
the exception of the last reason, advance notice of the intention
to sever the tie is the most professionally prudent approach.
Lawyers and judges may wish to draft standard email language to have on hand to use for this purpose, based on a
variety of reasons, with text that can be cut and pasted to suit
the occasion. They may also wish to cite to the opinion that,
in mandated instances, has caused the reason for the disconnection. As an example, in the case of Florida’s 2012 opinion
concerning connections between lawyers and judges on
LinkedIn, an email from a judge to a lawyer could read:
Although we have been connected on LinkedIn in
the past, and this connection has been beneficial, I
176 Court Review - Volume 53

must reluctantly break all connections on this site with
lawyers who may appear before me, due to a recent
opinion issued in May 2012 by the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee of the Florida Supreme Court (Opinion
No. 2012-12). Of course, this does not alter our opportunities to interact collegially outside of social-media
channels. Understandably, the Committee is concerned
about mistaken impressions about judicial influence,
which I am sure you agree is essential for us all to protect. So that you are not caught by surprise, or left to
wonder why I have broken our connection, I am sending this note as an advisory. Please contact me with any
questions.
A lawyer could send a similarly worded advisory to judges
in his or her network. Advance notice is far preferable to disappearing without any explanation for doing so, and having
email text readily available literally takes seconds to employ,
while leaving positive impressions that will be recalled for the
duration of one’s career.
IV. CONCLUSION

Social media, in some form, is very likely here to stay. Currently popular sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter,
may come and go, but their commonalities (public, immediate,
and permanent) will form the bases for any social-media sites
that may replace them in the future. Yet another commonality
that these social-media sites share is the lack of notification to
users when a connection chooses to sever ties.
No one engages in social-media activities planning to disconnect. On the contrary, the ultimate goals of becoming
involved in social-media activities on a professional level are to
strengthen and enhance current connections, develop new
contacts, and to establish an online presence that positively
solidifies one’s reputation in the legal community.
Because lawyers and judges are held to a higher standard of
professionalism than the average social-media user, clarification about best practices for disconnections between lawyers
and judges on social media has become a necessity. Such a lack
of guidance has the potential to create unnecessary confusion,
particularly in instances where the severing of social-media
ties is mandated. If such guidance were included in the MRPC
and MRJC based on the aforementioned general traits inherent
to social media, this would provide much-needed clarity for
years to come.

Kelly Lynn Anders is the executive director of
the Jackson County (Mo.) Law Library and
serves on the Editorial Board of Court Review.
Formerly an associate dean and law professor,
Anders has published and presented extensively on the topic of social-media ethics. She
is also the author of three books published by
the Carolina Academic Press, including Advocacy to Zealousness: Learning Lawyering Skills from Classic
Films (2012) and The Organized Lawyer (2d ed. 2015).

ELDER LAW?

by Judge Victor Fleming

Across
1 Evaluated, as a movie
6 Before, up front
9 And wife (Latin abbr.)
13 Drexler or Darrow
14 Fail to prevent
15 Overdone, as toast
16 What a trial loser may become
18 Clear
19 Start of an observation by Charles
Schulz
21 Canadian prov.
22 Show up, as in court
23 “Pet” that sprouts
27 Ken or Lena
30 Canadian prov.
31 Spicy sauces
34 Oodles
36 Part 2 of the observation
42 Pork ___
43 Be a snitch
44 Gilbert of “Roseanne”
48 “I Married the ___” (Jane Barkley
memoir)
50 Paddock youngster
51 Pilot Earhart
53 Covert WWII org.
56 End of the observation
61 Castle of dance
62 Start to earn more
65 Wind direction finders
66 When doubled, a Teletubby
67 Start of an asset-exploitation
adage

68 Nos. reported to a control
tower
69 Initials in fashion
70 About a yard, in York
Down
1 HDTV choice
2 Yodeling spot
3 Mistranscription, perhaps
4 Genesis place
5 Car battery brand
6 ___ the crowd (ham it up)
7 Ashcroft predecessor
8 Dramatic accusation
9 Satellite of Jupiter
10 Expense account listing
11 Topple, as from a throne
12 Nissan SUV model
15 Honk
17 Dawson or Dykstra
20 Expired, as a subscription
23 69-Across setting
24 “Yeah, right!”
25 “___ de France”
26 Fireplace fleck
28 Bobby of the Bears
29 U.N. agency
32 Be laid up, say
33 European tongue
35 Program guide abbr.
37 Tell a whopper
38 Abbr. after a comma
39 Sporty Pontiac
40 “___ be darned!”

41
44
45
46
47
49
52
54
55
57
58

Fishbowl accessory
Cannabis ___ (marijuana)
Nihilistic, perhaps
Atone
Some triangular garments
Mail-related
Chills, as a drink
Place to recuperate
Blood bank fluid
Like the storied duckling
Green veggies

59
60
63
64

Soften
Slim down
General address?
Summer, in Lyon

Vic Fleming is a district judge in
Little Rock, Arkansas.
Answers are found on page 173.
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The Best of Court Review
1998–2017
AJA WHITE PAPERS
Minding the Court: Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, by
Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke, and Steve Leben, 49 CT. REV. 76
(2013).
Social psychologist Pamela Casey and judges Kevin Burke
and Steve Leben jointly explored how the science of decision
making might help judges in their daily work.

Concluding a Successful Settlement Conference: It Ain’t Over Till
It’s Over, by Morton Denlow, 39(3) CT. REV. 14 (2002).
United States Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow provided
practical advice—and a handy “Judge’s Settlement Checklist/Term Sheet”—to help make sure that settlement agreements reached in a settlement conference couldn’t fall apart
afterward.

Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, by
Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2008).
The first of the American Judges Association’s white papers,
this paper made the case for judges focusing on proceduralfairness principles as the key to getting
public satisfaction with the courts in
general and greater compliance with
court orders in specific cases. The
paper reviewed the research on procedural fairness (also called procedural
justice) and presented detailed recommendations for judges, court administrators, courts, court leaders,
researchers, and judicial educators.

Municipal Court Mediation: Reducing the Barking Dog Docket, by
Karen Arnold-Burger, 35(3) CT. REV. 50 (1998).
Then municipal-court judge Karen Arnold-Burger told how
she started a mediation program with no money: “And the
best news? I haven’t heard a barking
dog case in months.”

The Debate over the Selection and Retention
of Judges: How Judges Can Ride the Wave,
by Mary A. Celeste, 46 CT. REV. 82
(2011).
Judge Mary Celeste put the debates
over judicial-selection systems in context—a context of American history
and recent United Supreme Court
decisions about what could be said in
judicial campaigns. She identified
challenges judges might face regardless of selection system.
The Judge Is the Key Component: The Importance of Procedural
Fairness in Drug-Treatment Courts, by Brian MacKenzie, 52 CT.
REV. 8 (2016).
Based on his own experience as a drug-court judge and data
from other studies, Judge Brian MacKenzie argued that the
judge is the key to drug-court success and that the successful drug-court judge must practice the principles of procedural fairness.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Breaking Impasses in Judicial Settlement Conferences: Seven
(More) Techniques for Resolution, 46 CT. REV. 130 (2011).
United States Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow provided
seven techniques (with examples) for getting parties to settle cases.

BOOK REVIEWS
Actual Innocence: The Justice System
Confronts Wrongful Convictions, by
Steve Leben, reviewing JIM DWYER,
PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM
THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED (2000),
36(4) CT. REV. 12 (2000).
The book set out in separate chapters
the typical ways the justice system
may go awry and the innocent found
guilty. The four most frequent causes
for 62 convictions found wrongful by
DNA testing: eyewitness error, flawed
blood-serology inclusions, police misconduct, and prosecutorial misconduct.
A Psycholegal Deskbook for Bench and Bar: Book Review of Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law, by John W. Brown
and Benjamin K. Hoover, reviewing FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS IN
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS (Ronald
Roesch and Patricia A. Zapf eds. 2012), 51 CT. REV. 4 (2015).
Virginia trial judge John W. Brown and his court’s staff attorney, Benjamin Hoover, looked at the usefulness for judges of
a comprehensive deskbook about forensic psychological
assessments used in civil and criminal proceedings. The book
covers empirical foundations and limits for all of the leading
types of assessments, and our reviewers found that the book’s
“value lies as a solid background and reference volume.”
Do Happier Judges Make Better Judges?, by Steve Leben, reviewing NANCY LEVIT and DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER:
MAKING A GOOD LIFE IN THE LAW (2010), 45 Ct. Rev. 132 (2010).
Law professors Nancy Levit and Douglas Linder brought

All Court Review articles from 1998 to the present can be found at amjudges.org/publications.
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together psychological research on what makes people
happy in their lives and work, applying it to lawyers. Our
reviewer considered how those lessons might be used to
make courts and courthouses better places to work.
Fugitive Justice: Slavery and the Law in Pre-Civil War America, by
Karen Arnold-Burger, reviewing STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE:
RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON TRIAL (2010), 46 CT. REV.
116 (2010).
The book looks at enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts in
the years leading up to the Civil War and the role of attorneys and judges of the time in using it to shape the debate
over slavery. Judge Karen Arnold-Burger reviewed the book
and the times, noting that the book includes detailed
accounts of three trials, with excerpts from trial transcripts
and considerations of trial strategy.
Law in a Therapeutic Key: A Resource for Judges, by Thomas T.
Merrigan, reviewing LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996),
37(1) CT. REV. 8 (2000).
Judge Thomas Merrigan reviewed this
book on therapeutic jurisprudence,
the view generally that since legal proceedings can affect the psychological
well-being of participants, judges
should use their discretion to promote
therapeutic outcomes where that’s
possible without running contrary to
any of the judge’s legal duties.
The book collected key articles
exploring the role of therapeutic
jurisprudence.
The Politics of Judges, by Frank B. Cross,
reviewing TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999),
37(2) CT. REV. 18 (2000).
In her book, Terri Jennings Peretti
argued that judges made decisions
based on their politics, not neutral principles of law, that
judges must tailor decisions to congressional politics, and
that this is a good thing. Professor Frank Cross noted limitations in her review of political-science research, but also
found her argument “an interesting one, well supported, and
deserving of a hearing.”
Writing Like the Best Judges, by Steve Leben, reviewing ROSS
GUBERMAN, POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S BEST
JUDGES (2014), 51 CT. REV. 90 (2015).
Legal-writing consultant Ross Guberman uses opinion
excerpts from 34 judges known for their writing abilities to
show how every part of a judicial opinion can be done at the
highest level. Our reviewer’s conclusion: “Any judge who
studies the book will become a better writer. And an already
talented writer who reads the book will also become a better
judge.”

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND FAMILY LAW
Dealing with Complex Evidence of Domestic Violence: A Primer for
the Civil Bench, by Jane H. Aiken and Jane C. Murphy, 39(2) CT.
REV. 12 (2002).
Professors Jane Aiken and Jane Murphy discussed how to
handle the evidentiary issues that frequently arise in domestic-violence cases.
Special Issue on Handling Domestic-Violence Cases, 53 Ct. Rev. 1
(2017).
Our most recent special-issue on handling domestic-violence cases included a bench card on steps to increase safety
when handling domestic-violence cases, resources (including a list of key articles), and separate articles on expert-witness standards, batterer-intervention programs, and the vantage point of victims.
Screening for Domestic Violence: Meeting the Challenge of Identifying Domestic Relations Cases Involving Domestic Violence and
Developing Strategies for Those Cases,
by Julie Kunce Field, 39(2) CT. REV. 4
(2002).
A primer on how to screen for safety
issues and what judges can—and cannot—do to keep people safe in those
cases.
The Myth of Epidemic False Allegations
of Sexual Abuse in Divorce Cases, by
Merrilyn McDonald, 35(1) CT. REV. 12
(1998).
Social worker Merrilyn McDonald
reviewed the incidence of child sexual abuse in society and in divorce
cases, as well as the research showing
that false allegations were not widespread.
Visits in Cases Marked by Violence:
Judicial Actions That Can Help Keep
Children and Victims Safe, by Julie
Kunce Field, 35(3) CT. REV. 23 (1998).
The introduction to the article put it well: “It’s a judge’s
worst nightmare—a mother and child killed in the process
of making a court-ordered visitation exchange.” Then-Professor Julie Kunce Field went from that real-life case example to explain both the power dynamics and domestic violence and a series of steps judges could take in court orders
to help keep victims safe.
FOR THE NEW JUDGE
Isolation in the Judicial Career, by Isaiah M. Zimmerman, 36(4)
CT. REV. 4 (2000).
Psychologist Isaiah Zimmerman talked about how the cutting of ties with many others that typically occurs when a
person becomes a judge may affect judges of varying personality traits. Though “[i]solation is not going to be
removed from the judicial career,” he suggested several steps
judges can take to maintain a healthy life and judicial career:
Court Review - Volume 53 179

“By understanding and actively employing the measures recommended, a judge can transmute isolation into a rewarding
resource.”
So You’re Going to Be a Judge: Ethical Issues for New Judges, by
Cynthia Gray, 52 CT. REV. 80 (2016).
Judicial-ethics expert Cynthia Gray presented a primer for
every new judge on the steps the judge must take to clear the
decks ethically when taking the bench.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Extrajudicial Speech: Navigating Perils and Avoiding Pitfalls, by
William G. Ross, 38(2) CT. REV. 36 (2001).
Professor William Ross examined the disqualification of the
federal judge who had been presiding over a Microsoft
antitrust case for extrajudicial speech to reporters. Ross provides practical suggestions for dealing with the media in an
ethical manner.
Good Judging and Good Judgment, by
Stephen C. Yeazell, 35(3) CT. REV. 8
(1998).
Professor Stephen Yeazell addressed
the question, “When does independence become lawlessness?,” examining the case of an intermediate appellate judge who announced he would
refuse to follow a ruling of the court
above him. Yeazell: “[A]ny discerning
defense of judicial independence will
mean disapproval of some judicial
behavior.”
On Judge Posner and the Perils of Commenting on Pending or Impending Proceedings, by Steven Lubet, 37(2) CT. REV.
4 (2000).
The Ethics of Judicial Commentary: A
Reply to Lubet, by Richard A. Posner,
37(2) CT. REV. 6 (2000).
When Is an Investigation Merely an Investigation? A Reply to Posner, by Steven Lubet, 37(2) CT. REV. 7 (2000).
Free Speech for Judges: A Commentary on Lubet et al. v. Posner,
by Monroe H. Freedman, 37(4) CT. REV. 4 (2001).
Free Speech and Judicial Neutrality: A Reply to Professor Freedman, by Steven Lubet, 37(4) CT. REV. 6 (2001).
In 1999, Judge Richard Posner wrote a book about the
impeachment of President Bill Clinton, offering the opinion
that President Clinton had committed “various felonious
obstructions of justice” and clearly “perjured himself in the
Paula Jones deposition.” Professor Steven Lubet, an expert
on judicial ethics, argued in Court Review that Posner had
violated judicial-ethics rules “by commenting on both pending and impending proceedings.” We gave Judge Posner the
opportunity to respond and Professor Lubet the opportunity
to close out the discussion.
That debate led to another essay by Professor Monroe Freedman, another legal-ethics expert. Freedman sided generally
with Judge Posner on First Amendment grounds, though he
180 Court Review - Volume 53

suggested an amendment to judicial-ethics rules. Professor
Lubet again responded.
So You’re Going to Be a Judge: Ethical Issues for New Judges, by
Cynthia Gray, 52 CT. REV. 80 (2016).
See the description under “For the New Judge.”
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Remarks on Judicial Independence, by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 43
CT. REV. 112 (2008).
In remarks to the AJA’s annual educational conference, Justice Ginsburg discussed both historic and recent threats to
judicial independence.
JURY TRIALS
First, Do No Harm: On Addressing the Problem of Implicit Bias in
Juror Decision Making, by Jennifer K. Elek and Paula Hannaford-Agor, 49 CT. REV. 190 (2013).
Implicit Bias and the American Juror, by
Jennifer K. Elek and Paula HannafordAgor, 51 CT. REV. 116 (2015).
In a 2013 article, researchers Jennifer
Elek and Paula Hannaford-Agor
reviewed various measures that have
been used in an attempt to reduce the
potential for implicit bias in jury verdicts. Based on social-science research,
they identified the most promising
practices. In a follow-up article in 2015,
they reviewed the results of a mock-jury
experiment using specialized jury
instructions aimed at reducing juror
bias. The researchers found “some preliminary evidence to suggest that a specialized instruction could alter expressions of bias in juror judgments.” The
2015 article provided a sample instruction that might be used, annotated to
show the research supporting each of
the statements it contained.
Jury Instructions in the New Millennium, by Peter M. Tiersma,
36(2) CT. REV. 28 (1999).
Law professor and linguist Peter Tiersma shows how pattern
jury instructions based on legal language can easily be misunderstood by jurors. He also provides several suggestions
for writing instructions the average juror would understand.
His conclusion: “Today there are modern doomsayers who
continue to claim that the law is scarcely expressible in ordinary English. It is time to prove them wrong.”
On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They Enter
the Jury Room, by Gregory E. Mize, 36(1) CT. REV. 10 (1999).
After cochairing the District of Columbia’s jury-reform project, Judge Gregory Mize began his own experiment, conducting individual voir dire in a small room with each potential juror. He found that potential jurors who had been silent
in open court often told much more in this setting—with
example after example of key information that would not

have been discovered under normal procedures. His conclusion: “I am convinced that even if individual questioning
took up significant amounts of time (which it has not for
me), it would be well worth expending the effort in order to
avoid juror UFO’s and the consequent danger of mistrials
caused by impaneling biased or disabled citizens.”
Special Issue on Jury Reform, 41(1) CT. REV. 1 (2004).
In this special issue, we reviewed the use of various jury-trial
innovations (like letting jurors ask questions or take notes),
evaluative research on how well these innovations allowed
jurors to better understand the evidence, and what happened
when questions jurors submitted weren’t asked.
LEGAL WRITING
Clearing the Cobwebs from Judicial Opinions, by Bryan A. Garner,
38(2) CT. REV. 4 (2001).
Against Footnotes, by Richard A. Posner, 38(2) CT. REV. 24
(2001).
No Longer Speaking in Code, by Rodney
Davis, 38(2) CT. REV. 26 (2001).
Afterword, by Bryan A. Garner, 38(2)
CT. REV. 28 (2001).
Bryan Garner, editor of Black’s Law
Dictionary and author of several
usage books, including Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, presented a
simple proposition for judges: put all
the citations in footnotes while keeping all the substance in the text. If
you’ve never tried it, take a look at
the examples Garner provided in this
article. Judge Richard Posner
responded—opposing
footnotes
altogether. Another judge, Rodney
Davis, explained how he’d adapted
to putting citations in footnotes.
First Things First: The Lost Art of Summarizing, by Joseph Kimble, 38(2) CT.
REV. 30 (2001).
Professor Joseph Kimble showed how to summarize to write
great judicial-opinion openers, better legal memos, and
understandable contracts, statutes, and rules.
How to Write an Impeachment Order, by Joseph Kimble, 36(2)
CT. REV. 8 (1999).
While Professor Joseph Kimble used the order that ended
the impeachment of President Bill Clinton as the take-off
point for this piece, he mainly showed how to take bloated
prose and prune it down to its essence. His conclusion:
“How do you write an impeachment order? The same way
you should write any legal sentence, paragraph, page, or
document. In plain language.”
Writing Like the Best Judges, by Steve Leben, reviewing ROSS
GUBERMAN, POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S BEST
JUDGES (2014), 51 CT. REV. 90 (2015).
See the description under “Book Reviews.”

MAKING BETTER JUDGES®
A Court and a Judiciary That Is as Good as Its Promise, by Kevin
S. Burke, 40(2) CT. REV. 4 (2003).
In remarks on receiving the William H. Rehnquist Award for
Judicial Excellence, Judge Kevin Burke argued for a judiciary
“known not just for speed and efficiency . . . but also for
other, less quantifiable aspects of justice—things like fairness and respect, attention to human equality, a focus on
careful listening, and a demand that people leave our courts
understanding our orders.”
A New Model for Civil Case Management: Efficiency Through
Intrinsic Engagement, by David Prince, 50 CT. REV. 174 (2014).
Colorado trial judge David Prince considered ways to mold
the management of civil litigation around procedural-justice
and organizational-management research findings. He
explained how these findings should frame a judge’s thinking about case management and made specific suggestions
for managing civil cases.
Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts,
Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren,
Fred L. Cheesman, and Jennifer K.
Elek, 49 CT. REV. 64 (2013).
Researchers Pamela Casey, Fred
Cheesman, and Jennifer Elek joined
with former judge and National Center
for State Courts president Roger Warren
to outline seven research-based strategies for reducing the influence of
implicit bias in decision making. The
article was research-based, highly practical, and written specifically for judges
and other court personnel.
Courting Justice with the Heart: Emotional Intelligence in the Courtroom, by
Nancy Perry Lubiani and Patricia H
Murrell, 38(1) CT. REV. 10 (2001).
Two judicial educators discussed the
importance of emotional intelligence for judging and how to
use judicial education to enhance it.
Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions, by Eyal Peer and Eyal
Gamliel, 49 CT. REV. 114 (2013).
Israeli researchers Eyal Peer and Eyal Gamliel review common decision-making fallacies judges are susceptible to,
including confirmation bias, hindsight bias, the conjunction
fallacy, and an inability to ignore inadmissible evidence.
They also recount a famous Israeli experiment with judges
making parole decisions where the judges were more likely
to grant paroles at the beginning of the day or after a break.
High-Profile Cases: Are They More Than a Wrinkle in the Daily
Routine?, by Robert Alsdorf, 47 CT. REV. 32 (2011).
Seattle judge Robert Alsdorf handled a very high-profile case
during the year he would be up for reelection. He provided
guidance on how to craft the decision to be accessible and
understood. Excerpts from his written decision, which overCourt Review - Volume 53 181

turned a change in the state constitution adopted in a referendum, were included.

advice about handling cases with one or more self-represented parties.

Informing Criminal Defendants of the Immigration Consequences
of Their Convictions: The Trial Judge’s Duty, by Kate Ono Rahel
and Justin Shilhanek, 50 CT. REV. 196 (2014).
After the United States Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that defense attorneys must
advise their clients in some circumstances of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, we recruited two law students to look at the obligation of judges during these same
plea proceedings. Kate Ono Rahel and Justin Shilhanek provided a thorough review of the caselaw and detailed recommendations for trial judges handling plea proceedings.

Special Issue on Elder Mistreatment, 53 CT. REV. 53 (2017).
With the help of special-issue editor, Professor Nina Kohn,
this special issue covered aspects of elder mistreatment that
judges can impact. Separate articles presented perspectives
of the physician, judge, prosecutor, law professor, and
guardian.

Isolation in the Judicial Career, by Isaiah M. Zimmerman, 36(4)
CT. REV. 4 (2000).
See description under “For the New Judge.”
Judges and Wrongful Convictions, by
Brandon L. Garrett, 48 CT. REV. 132
(2012).
Law professor Brandon Garrett
wrote a book, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go
Wrong (2011), discussing the mistakes found in the first 250 DNAexoneration cases. In this article for
Court Review, he focused on the
lessons for judges.
Judicial Wisdom: An Introductory Empirical Account, by Jeremy A. Blumenthal
and Daria A. Bakina, 52 CT. REV. 72
(2016).
The late professor Jeremy Blumenthal and professor Daria Bakina conducted a study on what makes a
judge wise based on surveys of both
judges and law students. Professor
Bakina summarized the findings, some of the first empirical
studies of what might constitute judicial wisdom. Any judge
would benefit just from reading through the lists of traits
that might make for a wise and excellent judge.
Minding the Court: Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, by
Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke, and Steve Leben, 49 CT. REV. 76
(2013).
See the description under “AJA White Papers.”
Practical Advice from the Trenches: Best Techniques for Handling
Self-Represented Litigants, by Dorothy J. Wilson and Miriam B.
Hutchins, 51 CT. REV. 54 (2015).
Baltimore judges Dorothy Wilson and Miriam Hutchins,
who have more than 30 years of combined experience dealing with self-represented litigants, gave their advice on what
techniques work best. They discussed the concept of neutral engagement, in which judges remain neutral but help
make sure cases are fully presented and gave step-by-step
182 Court Review - Volume 53

Special Issue on Indian Law and Tribal Courts, 45 CT. REV. 1
(2009).
This special issue focused on the ways Indian Law arises in
state-court proceedings, interactions between tribal courts and
state courts, and how to research Indian Law.
Special Issue on Law and Neuroscience, 50 CT. REV. 44 (2014).
Court Review teamed up with the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (www.lawneuro.org) for this
special issue. Articles covered an
overview of the ways in which brain science has been integrated into law; what
the legal system can infer about individuals from group-based neuroscience
data; how science on adolescent development should (and shouldn’t) be
applied; how pain neuroimaging may be
used in legal disputes; and where neuroscience contributions may be the most
useful in law.
Special Issue on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 37(1) CT. REV. 1 (2000).
This special issue explored therapeutic
jurisprudence—“TJ” to its friends and
supporters—which focuses on the therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences
legal proceedings may cause. TJ proponents suggest that judges should, wherever possible, work to obtain therapeutic outcomes without
violating other important values, like due process. Articles in
the issue explored TJ in multiple contexts, including domestic-violence courts, mental-health courts, and on appeal.
Starting a Help Center in Twelve Easy Steps: One Court’s Experience with Trial, Error, and Lots of Help, by Keven M.P. O’Grady,
51 CT. REV. 74 (2015).
Many courts have set up self-help centers for the self-represented. Given the existence of established centers in many
places, a Kansas court was able to draw on the wisdom of
others when starting its own. Judge Keven O’Grady uses the
lessons he learned—from other courts and starting his own
center—to provide a step-by-step guide for any court looking to provide better help for the self-represented.
Ten Tips for Judges Dealing with the Media, by Steve Leben, 47
CT. REV. 38 (2011).
This article presented ten tips for dealing with the media

based on the recommendations of journalists and experience
handling two high-profile murder trials.
The Emotional Dimension of Judging: Issues, Evidence, and
Insights, by Sharyn Roach Anleu, David Rottman, and Kathy
Mack, 52 CT. REV. 60 (2016).
Researchers Sharyn Roach Anleu, David Rottman, and
Kathy Mack provided a look at the background research on
judging and emotions, presented specific examples of judicial misbehavior that seemed emotionally based, and
described a four-year international study they are conducting on judges and emotion.
The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (and Realistic) Ideal, by
Terry A. Maroney, 49 CT. REV. 100 (2013).
Law professor Terry Maroney discusses how judges can deal
with the emotions that naturally arise from their work,
drawing on insights from psychology, neuroscience, and the
experiences of judges.
The Implication of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction, by Deborah J. Chase and Peggy Fulton Hora,
37(1) CT. REV. 12 (2000).
Based on a survey of drug-court and
family-court judges, Deborah Chase
and Judge Peggy Fulton Hora found
that “[p]erception of litigant gratitude was the most important overall
predictor of feeling positively about
the judicial assignment.” Familycourt judges scored low in perceptions of litigant gratitude; drugcourt judges scored high. The
authors speculated that “the therapeutic effects of these new types of
courts,” such as drug courts, “which
employ the social sciences and are
oriented to problem solving” had
“beneficial effects on the litigants
and court personnel.”
Two Letters to Judge Eaton, by Paul D. Carrington, 37(2) CT. REV.
14 (2000).
Law professor Paul Carrington presented two letters he
wrote to a federal judge about the sentencing of a man he
knew. In the first letter, Carrington explained that the young
man had recently taken Carrington’s advice to get a job—
actually two—and was also in school. Carrington suggested
the man be given a chance to show he had truly changed.
Twenty-eight years later, Carrington told the judge, who had
given a suspended sentence, how the man had since become
a professor of cell biology at a major university. Carrington’s
conclusion: “I am informed that if [the man] had come up
for sentencing [at a later time] the judge would have had no
authority to suspend the sentence, and that he would have
spent as much as twenty years in the federal penitentiary.
What a tragic waste!”

Understanding and Diagnosing Court Culture, by Brian J. Ostrom
and Roger A. Hanson, 45 CT. REV. 104 (2010).
Brian Ostrom and Roger Hanson explained that court performance is often affected greatly by court culture. They
described and categorized court cultures, while noting the
impact court culture may have on attempts at court reform.
Who Are You Going to Believe?, by Richard Schauffler and Kevin
S. Burke, 49 CT. REV. 124 (2013).
Researcher Richard Schauffler and Judge Kevin Burke
reviewed the research on whether credibility judgments
can be accurately made either by judges or juries: “The
notion that whether a person is lying or telling the truth
can be detected by a trained expert remains a popular one,
but it is simply not supported by behavioral science.”
Given that limitation, they made three practical suggestions for judges.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS/PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
An Experiment in the Law: Studying a
Technique to Reduce Failure to Appear in
Court, by Alan J. Tomkins, Brian Bornstein, Michael N. Heriam, David I.
Rosenbaum, and Elizabeth M. Neeley,
48 CT. REV. 96 (2012).
Increasing Court-Appearance Rates and
Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone
Court-Date Reminders: The Jefferson
County, Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and
Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV. 86 (2012).
These two articles presented the results
of two pilot projects that achieved some
success in reducing no-show rates for
criminal defendants—saving time and
money while also having fewer warrants
and pretrial incarcerations. The articles
report for each test what worked, what
didn’t, and what merits further consideration. Researchers
indicated both that reducing failures-to-appear should result
in improved perceptions of court fairness by defendants and
that incorporating procedural-fairness principles into
reminder notices seemed to help reduce no-shows.
A New Model for Civil Case Management: Efficiency Through
Intrisic Engagement, by David Prince, 50 CT. REV. 174 (2014).
See the description under “Making Better Judges®.”
Decision Makers and Decision Recipients: Understanding Disparities in the Meaning of Fairness, by Diane Sivasubramaniam and
Larry Heuer, 44 CT. REV. 672 (2008).
Researchers Diane Sivasubramaniam and Larry Heuer discuss
important differences in the importance that decision recipients and decision makers place on fair procedures: decision
makers are more concerned with outcome, while decision
recipients are more concerned with process. This has important implications for judges, who are the decision makers.
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Fair Procedures, Yes. But We Dare Not Lose Sight of Fair Outcomes, by Brian H. Bornstein and Hannah Dietrich, 44 CT. REV.
72 (2008).
Law-and-psychology researchers Brian Bornstein and Hannah Dietrich reminded us that even if improving procedural
fairness is important, outcomes matter too. They noted that
the perception of unfairness is also based in part on perceptions of unfairness in distributive justice (the probability of
different outcomes for certain groups).
Opinions as the Voice of the Court: How State Supreme Courts Can
Communicate Effectively and Promote Procedural Fairness, by
William C. Vickrey, Douglas G. Denton, and Wallace B. Jefferson, 48 CT. REV. 74 (2012).
Former Texas Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, former California court administrative director William Vickrey, and
California court staffer Douglas Denton addressed the
changing audience for state supreme court opinions—an
audience now far beyond lawyers.
They urged further attention to
procedural-fairness principles by
state high courts and noted practices (plain-language summaries,
instant web access, and cooperation with the media) that have
helped clearly communicate court
opinions.
Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, by Kevin Burke and
Steve Leben, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2008).
See description under “AJA White
Papers.”
Procedural Justice and the Courts, by
Tom R. Tyler, 44 CT. REV. 26 (2008).
Professor Tom Tyler is the leading
researcher in procedural justice
for both law enforcement and the
courts. He provided an overview
of the concepts and research showing the effectiveness of
procedural-justice concepts when used in court proceedings.
Procedural Justice as a Court Reform Agenda, by David B.
Rottman, 44 CT. REV. 32 (2008).
Researcher David Rottman described how procedural justice
could act as an organizing principle for court reform.
The Courtroom-Observation Program of the Utah Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, by Nicholas H. Woolf and Jennifer MJ Yim, 47 CT. REV. 84 (2012).
Utah has a governmentally established commission that
evaluates judicial performance and provides public reports
before each judge’s retention election. The commission
adopted procedural-justice principles to govern its review
process and sends citizens to observe judges’ adherence to
those principles in the courtroom. Researcher Nicholas
Woolf and then commission vice chair Jennifer Yim
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described the process, including a list of 20 evaluative criteria that could be used by courtroom observers anywhere.
The Judge Is the Key Component: The Importance of Procedural
Fairness in Drug-Treatment Courts, by Brian MacKenzie, 52 CT.
REV. 8 (2016).
See description under “AJA White Papers.”
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW
A Judge’s Guide to Using Social Science, by John Monahan and
Laurens Walker, 43 CT. REV. 156 (2007).
Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker wrote the
book, literally, on Social Science in Law, a law-school text
that went through seven editions. In this article, they broke
down for judges how and when social-science information
can be used to determine a relevant question in a contested
court case.
Children as Witnesses: What We Hear
Them Say May Not Be What They Mean,
by David B. Battin and Stephen J. Ceci,
40(1) CT. REV. 4 (2003).
Researchers David Battin and Stephen
Ceci reviewed ways in which young children aren’t as prepared to answer questions in court as adults perceive them to
be, including problems understanding
prepositions like above or behind, and
problems with temporal terms.
Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific
Issues, by John C. Brigham, Adina W.
Waserman, and Christian A. Meissner,
36(2) CT. REV. 12 (1999).
Three academic researchers reviewed
both the leading research on what leads
to eyewitness-identification errors and
the United States Supreme Court cases on
the subject, noting a disconnect between
them. They also reviewed the “common knowledge” of
jurors in the area and safeguards that could be taken to protect against reliance on unreliable testimony.
Fact or Fiction? The Myth and Reality of the CSI Effect, by Steven
M. Smith, Veronica Stinson, and Marc W. Patry, 47 CT. REV. 4
(2011).
Should Judges Worry About the “CSI Effect”?, by Simon A. Cole
and Rachel Dioso-Villa, 47 CT. REV. 20 (2011).
Studying Juror Expectations for Scientific Evidence: A New Model
for Looking at the CSI Myth, by Donald E. Shelton, Gregg Barak,
and Young S. Kim, 47 CT. REV. 8 (2011).
In these three articles, we explored the claim that jurors (and
attorneys and judges) have changed their behavior based on
an expectation that forensic evidence should be available if a
defendant has committed a crime. Professors Steven Smith,
Veronica Stinson, and Marc Patry found that evidence that
the CSI effect is real but wondered whether the effect was
more due to changed attorney behavior than to the views of

jurors. Judge Donald Shelton and researchers Gregg Barak
and Young Kim also concluded the effect was real but due
not to television but to advances generally in technology.
And researchers Simon Cole and Rachel Dioso-Villa
expressed skepticism about the existence of a CSI effect
while offering suggested steps judges could take to guard
against it.
Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, by Patricia A. Zapf and Ronald Roesch, 37(2) CT. REV. 28
(2000).
Two leading psychology professors provided an overview of
methods for conducting competency exams and key information that should be in reports to the court.
Mental Illness and the Courts: Some Reflections on Judges as Innovators, by John P. Petrila and Allison D. Redlich, 43 CT. REV. 164
(2008).
Researchers John Petrila and Allison
Redlich discussed the roles judges
might play in helping those with
mental illness on their journey
through the court system, including
as a program designer, as a community leader, as an advocate, and as a
member of the treatment team.
Risk Assessment for Future Offending:
The Value and Limits of Expert Evidence
at Sentencing, by Kirk Heilbrun, Jaymes
Fairfax-Columbo, Suraji Wagage, and
Leah Brogan, 53 CT. REV. 116 (2017).
A team of researchers led by Professor Kirk Heilburn reviewed each of
the major risk-assessment tools in
use in court proceedings, discussing
the strengths and limitations of each
as well as the extent to which expert
opinion guided by some structured
judgment process might compare in
usefulness to the scored instruments. They also provided recommended best practices for
the use of risk assessments in court.
Special Issue on Eyewitness Evidence, 48 CT. REV. 1 (2012).
This special issue focused on social-science research on eyewitness evidence and how that information might be used by
judges, including in jury instructions.
Why Judges Must Insist on Electronically Preserved Recordings of
Child Interviews, by Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, 37(2)
CT. REV. 10 (2000).
Shortly after publication of their award-winning book, Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s Testimony, professors Stephen Ceci and Maggie Bruck explained
how interviews with children differ from ones with adults in
ways that can lead to error when the children’s statements
are merely recounted by others. They concluded: “If courts
are interested in historical accuracy, there is simply no sub-

stitute for a tape that can be played to verify . . . the details
of the discussion that took place . . . .”
PUBLIC OPINION OF THE COURTS
On Public Trust and Confidence: Does Experience with the Courts
Promote or Diminish It?, by David Rottman, 35(4) CT. REV. 14
(1998).
Looking at opinion research over an extended period,
National Center for State Courts researcher David Rottman
concluded that contact with the courts seemed “to have
either a neutral or moderately positive impact on how people rate the state courts,” a change from 20 years before. He
also concluded that “the public responds positively to efforts
courts make to be more accessible [and] more sensitive to
the perception of fairness in court decisions.”
Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion
Surveys Mean to Judges, by David B. Rottman and Alan J.
Tomkins, 36(3) CT. REV. 24 (1999).
Researchers David Rottman and Alan
Tomkins reviewed public-opinion surveys about state courts from 1978
through 1998. They explored differences in perception among racial and
ethnic groups and concluded, “Judges
can make a difference in how they and
their courts are perceived.”
Speak to Values: How to Promote the
Courts and Blunt Attacks on the Judiciary,
by John Russonello, 41(2) CT. REV. 10
(2004).
Public-opinion researcher John Russonello reported on what the public
most wanted from its courts and how
that information should form judicial
responses to attacks.
Special Issue on Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts, 36(3) CT. REV. 1
(1999).
For two days in May 1999, 500 attendees representing the
federal and state judiciary, the bar, the media, and the public
met for two days and participated in a National Conference
on Public Trust and Confidence in Washington, D.C. Court
Review provided the only comprehensive coverage of the
conference, publishing transcripts of key portions, including
speeches from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, and New York Governor Mario
Cuomo. Panel-discussion transcripts focused on public
opinion of the courts, critical issues affecting trust in the
courts, and strategies for improving the level of public trust.
Note: For volumes 35 through 42, each of the four issues in each
volume of Court Review was separately paginated (starting at 1
for each issue). From volume 43 forward, each volume has been
consecutively paginated throughout the volume. For clarity in the
citations to volumes 35 through 42, the issue is also noted. So the
citation 39(3) CT. REV. 14 is to the third issue in volume 39.
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Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries. About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges. Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, including municipal court and other specialized court judges. The remainder include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges,
and administrative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format. The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes). Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
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Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same format as articles. Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of double-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will consider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline. In addition to the outline, a comment about the specific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreciated. Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a completed article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.
Submission: Submissions should be made by email. Please send
them to Editors@CourtReview.org. Submissions will be acknowledged by email. Notice of acceptance, rejection, or requests for
changes will be sent following review.
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A
NEW PUBLICATIONS

JENNIFER K. ELEK, DAVID B. ROTTMAN,
SHELLEY SPACEK MILLER, AND LYDIA HAMBLIN, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: A
FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT THE PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE COURT TRIAL
JUDGES (34 pp.) (2017).
http://www.ncsc.org/judicialexcellence
The National Center for State Courts
has a new publication for state trial
judges on how to develop excellence in
nine key areas. The Elements of Judicial
Excellence grew out of an intensive consultation process with the Illinois courts.
Illinois judges identified their best
judges—and National Center staff did
extensive interviews with 103 of those
judges to get a preliminary list of the
characteristics associated with judicial
excellence and then to identify the quali-

ties potentially amenable to development. Researchers further refined their
data and conclusions with focus groups
and a survey.
The resulting framework is broader
than knowledge of the law and court
rules. Top judges also identified the need
to have broader knowledge about the
court community, stakeholder agencies,
and other resources that can contribute
to better problem solving or decision
making. Participants also said that procedural-fairness skills and the ability to
handle the emotions encountered while
judging should be developed.
The framework of areas for judicial
development has nine elements:
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1. Ethics & Integrity: Understands the
ethical challenges faced by judges and
how to properly address them to
uphold the actual and perceived
integrity of the judiciary.
2. Engagement: Engages in the work of
the assignment and supports colleagues in executing the mission of the
court. Embraces performance feedback and seeks out opportunities for
professional development.
3. Well-Being: Engages in self-care practices to manage stress and maintain
physical and psychological health.
4. Knowledge of the Law & Justice System: Understands the legal and operational matters relevant to the assignment. Builds knowledge from relevant
disciplines and understands their
implications in daily work.
5. Critical Thinking: Uses analytical and
problem-solving skills to evaluate the
available information and take the best
action possible in a timely manner.
6. Self-Knowledge & Self-Control: Understands how one’s personal perspective, values, preferences, mental
state, and way of thinking can impact decisionmaking and others’ perceptions of fairness.
Develops and applies
strategies to manage
emotions and address
biases in judgment and
behavior.
7. Managing the Case
& Court Process: Directs docket and
courtroom operations by planning and
coordinating schedules, managing
case processing timelines, and facilitating information exchange between
parties in a case, court staff, and other
stakeholders.
8. Building Respect & Understanding:
Interacts effectively with all those
who work in or appear before the
court in a manner conducive to a fair
process and just outcomes. Listens
attentively to others and provides
clear and effective communication to
ensure a shared understanding of the
issues in the case, court processes,
and decisions.

9. Facilitating Resolution: Engages with
parties and stakeholders to build consensus on matters that will allow for
forward case progress and a focus on
reaching a resolution.
For each of those areas, the Elements of
Judicial Excellence provides a summary of
the advice given by the respected judges
who were interviewed, examples of what
respected judges do in each area, and relevant resources.

FOR YOUR IPHONE OR IPAD

BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN
ENGLISH USAGE (4th ed. 2016).
The App Store ($24.95).
For iPhone and iPad users, you now
can have the best modern book on English usage at hand at all times. That’s
because the full text of the 1,100-page
Oxford University Press book is now
available as an iPhone or iPad app. The
grammar nerd in you wants it. The writer
in you needs it.
The book’s 8,000 entries cover word
usage, punctuation, pronunciation, and
writing. Is it pled or pleaded? (Answer:
pleaded is preferred but pled has recently
gained ground in American English.)
How is fulsome properly used? (Answer:
the traditional meaning is “abundant to
excess” but incorrect usage as “very full”
has become common.) Do good writers
really care about when to use that and
when to use which? (Answer: yes!)
Garner includes lots of writing advice
within the book. An entry on “Sentence
Length,” for example, gives the average
sentence length for leading publications.
Garner then advises that varying the
length of your sentences is important too.
And the book has a linguistic glossary
that’s probably the most complete one
available for grammatical, rhetorical, and
other language-related terms.
The app contains all of the book’s content—plus quizzes you can take. They
include links to the applicable entry for
each missed question.

